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1. Pub.  L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat . 2767 (1980) (codified as amen ded in 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1994 )). The Su per fund  Amen dme nt s an d Rea ut hor izat ion  Act  (SAR A)
of 198 6, P ub . L.  No.  99-4 99,  100  St at . 16 13 (1 986 ) am en de d CE RCL A.
2. Genera l Elec. Co. v. Aamco Tra nsm ission s , I n c., 962 F.2d 28 1, 285 (2d Cir.
199 2).  CERCLA h as a  nu mber  of aims, in cluding:
(1) t o  provide an incentive for maximum care in the prevention of releases;
(2) to as sur e th at  res ponsib le par ties bear  the full cost of their activities; (3)
to encourage th e inter n a l iz a tion  of he al th  an d e nv ir on me nt  cost s; (4 ) to
encour age  compen sat ion of innocent  victims  b y r emov ing  difficu lt p roof
burdens; (5) to place incentives for greater  care on the pa rties  w it h  t he best
kn owledge o r  r isks  inh er en t in  th e wa st es a nd  in t he  bes t p osit ion t o
cont rol a nd s uper vise th eir dis posal; (6) to spre ad costs ; and  (7) to encoura ge
efficient re sou rce  all ocat ion.
United  Sta tes v. Mia mi D r u m  Serv.,  No. 85-0038-Civ-Aronovitz, 1986 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16501 , a t  *10 n.4 (S.D. F la. Dec. 12 , 1986) (citing S . RE P . NO . 96-848, at 12,
15, 31-3 4 (19 80)).
3. S ee Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491  U.S . 1, 7 (1 989) (“CE RCL A both
provides a mechan ism for cleaning up hazar dous-waste sites, and imposes the c ost s
of th e clea nu p on  th ose r esp onsib le fo r th e contamina tion.” (citations omitt ed)). The
federa l gove rn me nt , st at es , a nd  pr iva te  pa rt ies  ma y se ek  re im bu rs em en t fr om
poten tia lly respon s ib le  p a r ties  for e xpe ns es i ncu rr ed i n t he  clea nu p of a  re lea se or
th rea t ened rele ase of a h aza rdou s su bsta nce. Th e EP A can orde r a  poten tia lly
res ponsible  part y to commen ce cleanu p operations or ma y conduct t he cleanup
measu res  i t se lf  and  then  sue t he r espon sible pa rt ies for n ecessa ry clea nu p costs . S ee
42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606, 9607 (199 4). C ou rt s a re  no t ob liga te d t o de fer  to t he  EP A’s
conclu sion s on is su es of li ab ilit y beca us e “[c]our ts , not  th e E PA, a re  th e a dju dica tor s
of the s cope of CERCLA liabili ty.” Redwing Carrier s, Inc. v. Sarala nd Apts., 94 F.3d
1489, 150 7 n .24  (11t h C ir . 19 96).
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A Uniform Approach for Det erm ining Arra nger
Liability Un der CE RCLA
I. IN T R O D U C T I O N
 The Compr ehe ns ive E nvir onm en t a l Re sp onse, Compensa-
t ion , an d Liability Act of 19801 (CERCLA) “i s a  b road , r emedia l
s t a tu t e ena cted by Congress in order  t o ena ble the E nvironm en-
t a l P r otect ion Agency (EP A) to resp ond qu ickly an d effectively
to ha zard ous wast e spills th at  th rea ten  th e en vironmen t .”2
CERCLA pla ces th e ult ima te r espon sibilit y for  the cle anup of
hazardous wast e on th ose respons ible for t he pr oblems caused
by the disp osal of th at  wast e.3
Due to “th e difficulty in  pr escrib ing in  st at ut ory te rm s lia -
bility  s t andards  which  [would] be applicable in individual
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4. 126 CO N G. RE C . S3 0,9 32 (1 980 ).
5. O’Neil  v. Picillo, 883 F .2d 176, 17 9 n.4  (1st  Cir . 198 9); see also 126 CO N G.
RE C . 31,965 (1980) (“To insure the development of a uniform r ule of law, and to
dis cour age  bu siness dealing in ha zardous su bstan ces from locating primar ily in states
with  more lenient  laws, the bill will encourage th e further  development of a Federal
comm on law in  th is ar ea.”). 
6. 126 CO N G. RE C . S30,932  (1980). 
7. Exx on  Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 , 368  (198 6). Th re e h az ar dou s s ub st an ce
response bills wer e fully consider ed an d reject ed by th e 96th  Congre ss. S ee id. at 365-
66 n.8. The bi ll tha t beca me CE RCLA “was int rodu ced as a  floor amen dme nt  in t he
Sena te in  th e wan in g da ys o f th e la me -du ck s es sio n o f t he 9 6th  Congr ess.” Id . at 379
n .5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The bill “beca me  th e su bject  of an  11t h-h our
compr omise .” Id. “Th e on ly leg isla tiv e h ist ory  on t he  compromise is fou nd  in t he  floor
deba tes .” Un it ed  St a tes  v. U SX Corp., 68 F.3d 811, 821 n .20 (3d Cir. 1995) (quot ing
United  St at es  v. A & F  Ma te ri al s C o., 5 78 F . Su pp . 12 49,  125 3 (S .D.  Ill . 19 84)).
8. U S X Corp., 68 F.3d a t 821 n .20 (quotin g A & F Mat erials,  578  F . Supp . a t
125 3); see also Un ited  Sta tes  v. Cordova  Chem . Co., 113 F.3 d 572, 578  (6th  Cir. 1 997)
(“[I]t  is d ifficul t t o divin e t he  spe cific, a s opp osed  to t he  gen er al,  goa ls of Congress
with  respect to CERCLA liability since the sta t u t e  r epresen t s  an  e leven th  hour
com pr om ise .”), vaca ted  an d r em an ded  on ot her  grou nd s su b n om . Unit ed St at es v.
Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. American Airlines,  Inc.,
98 F.3d  564, 570 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[C]ourt s ha ve complain ed CER CLA is ina rt fully
drafted, and  is  ‘r i dd led  wi th incons iste ncies a nd r edu nda ncies.’ ” (quo t ing  Un it ed
Stat es v. Rohm  & Ha as C o., 2 F.3d 1 265, 1270  n.6 (3d Cir . 1995))); CP  Hol din gs,  In c.
v. Goldb er g-Zoino &  Assocs ., 769  F. S up p. 43 2, 43 5 (D.N .H . 199 1) (“Depe nd ing  on
what de fin ition s are a ccorded to various words an d phra ses within t he sta tut e,
sections, subsections, and eve n  s en t en ces  wit hi n C ER CLA s eem  to con tr ad ict
them selves wit h l it tl e or  no  in te rn al  con sis te ncy .”).
9. S ee S ou t h  F la. Wat er Mgt . Dist. v. Mont alvo, 84 F.3d  402, 406 (11th  Cir .
1996) (“Congress has left this task  to the c ou r t s , a n d  t h e c ou r t s  h a ve  a t  t im e s
stru ggled wit h t he  con tou rs  of ‘arr an ger ’ liabi lit y u nd er  § 107 (a)(3 ).”).
10. S ee Un ited  Sta tes  v. Nort hea ste rn  Ph ar m. & Ch em. C o., 5 79  F . Supp. 823,
838 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (refe rr ing  to C ER CLA a s a  “ha st ily d ra wn  pie ce of
compromise leg isl at ion , m ar re d b y va gu e t er mi no logy  an d d ele te d p ro vis ion s”).
11. S ee, e.g.,  United Stat es v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1885-86 n.9 (1998)
(“[T]here  is s ign ifican t d isa gr eem en t a mon g cour ts  an d com m enta tor s  over  whe the r ,
in  en forcin g CE RCL A’s in dir ect  lia bilit y, cou rt s sh ould  bor row  sta te la w, o r  ins tead
apply  a feder al comm on law of veil pier cing.”); Pen nsylva nia  v. Un ion  Gas Co., 491
U.S. 1, 46-47 (1989) (White, J ., concurr ing in p ar t, diss ent ing in p ar t) (rea sonin g  t h at
cases ,”4 Congress deliberately gave the court s the ta sk of
developin g a  “un i form approach”5 of deter minin g liability issues
th rough th e “tr adit ional an d evolving prin ciples of common
law .”6 This ha s proven difficult s ince CERCLA “was p rep a red
and pass ed in considera ble has te”7 and as a  r e su l t,  the  st a tu t e
was “ina dequ at ely dr aft ed.”8 Court s ha ve bee n  left wit h t he
difficult  t a sk  of de ter min in g it s s cope and in ten t .9 Due to
ambigui ty in t he la ngu age of CERCLA,10 i ns t ead  of a  un iform
approach , th ere  is a  split  of opin ion in fede ra l cour t s  on  many
issues that impa ct liability determinations.11
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t ak ing a jud icial hea dcount  is not  disposit ive, but  does su gges t  tha t th e stat ute’s
p rov is ions about stat e liability are not un mistaka bly clear and t hat  “experienced
ju r is t s cou ld d isa gr ee  ab ou t C on gr es s’ int en t u nd er  CE RCL A”).
12. Accordin g to 4 2 U .S.C . § 960 7(a)(3 ) (1994 ), lia bilit y will  at ta ch t o:
any person who by contract, agreem ent , or o ther wise arr an ged f or d i sposa l
or  treatm ent, or arran ged with a tr ansporter for transport for disposa l or
t r ea tmen t , of hazardous s ubsta nces owned or possessed by su ch person, by
any o ther  part y  or  e n tity , at  an y facil ity  or in cine ra tion  ves sel  own ed or
operated  by an othe r pa rt y or ent ity  a nd  con tain ing  such  haza rdous
substa nces . . . .
Id . (em ph as is a dd ed ).
13. The Second, Third, and Eighth  Circuits do not require t hat  a par ty inten ded
tha t  th e ha zar dous wa stes  be dispose d of before imposin g ar ra nge r  liabilit y. S ee, e.g.,
United  States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 712 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[R]esponsible
part ies are liable for response costs regardless  of their intent.”); United States v. TIC
Inv.  Corp., 68 F .3d 1082, 1088 (8t h Cir . 1995) (rejectin g defendants’  “specific intent
a rgumen t”) ; Gener al Elec. Co. v. Aamco Trans missions, Inc., 962 F .2d 281, 285 (2d
Cir . 1992) (“In en actin g CERCLA, Congr ess es ta blished four gr oups of res ponsible
pa rties, all of whom are liable regardless of intent . . . .”). The Sixth and S e ve n th
Circu it s have det e r mined  th at  th e te rm  “arr an ged for” implie s int ent iona l action . S ee,
e.g., Un it ed  St at es  v. C ell o-F oil P ro ds ., I nc. , 10 0 F .3d  122 7, 1 231  (6th  Cir. 1 996) (“We
conclude  th at  th e r equ isit e in qu ir y is w he th er  th e pa rt y in te nd ed t o en te r in to a
tr an sact ion th at  in clu de d a n ‘ar ra ng em en t for ’ the  dis pos al  of ha za rd ou s s ub st an ces .”);
Amcast In du s. C or p. v . De tr ex C or p.,  2 F .3d  746 , 75 1 (7 th  Cir. 1 993) (reas oning t ha t
“arranged  for” implies int ent iona l action).  Th e E leve nt h C ir cui t con sid er s fa ctor s s uch
as inten t, ownership an d knowledge, in determinin g whether  a par ty has “arr anged
for” th e di spos al of ha zar dous  sub sta nces. S ee, e.g.,  Montalvo, 84 F.3d at 406-09. The
Four th an d Ten th  Circuit s ha ve n o t  direct ly add res sed t he is sue . S ee United St ates
v. Nort h La ndin g Line Cons tr . Co. , 3 F . Su pp .2d  694 , 69 9 (E .D.  Va.  199 8) (“[T]h e
Four th Circuit Court of Appeals has not definitively interpr eted the ph r ase [arr anged
for  disposal].”); United Sta tes v. Gordon Stafford, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 337, 339 (N.D.
W. Va. 1997) (“[I]t does not appea r as if the F ourth  Circuit has defined or inter preted
the term [arra nged for].”); Mathews v. Dow Chem.  Co., 947 F. Supp. 1517, 1523 (D.
Colo.  1996 ) (“As to t he  te rm  ‘ar ra ng ed for ,’ n o cour t  wi th in  the  Tenth  Circu it  has
interpr eted  it . . . .”). 
14. F o r exam ple, “disposal” is defin ed in  42 U.S .C. § 6903(3) (1994). See infra
no te 38. “Facilit y” is defined in  42 U.S .C. § 9601(9) (1994). See infra note 34.
15. Mathews, 947 F. Supp. a t 1523; see Gregor y A. Robins, Note , Cat ellus
Development  Cor por at ion v . Un ite d St at es: A “Solid” Approach to CERCLA “Arranger”
Liability, or a “Waste” of Natural R esources?, 47 H A S T I N G S  L.J . 189, 190 (1995)
(“Congress’s failur e to define  th e cru cial ter m ‘arra nge’ in the  provision  left  cour ts
with  lit tl e or  no  gu ida nce  as  to i ts  in te nd ed  scop e.”).
One issue on wh ich cour ts a re split  is wha t t he t erm
“ar ra nged for,” as used in  42 U.S.C. § 9607(a )(3),12 means. 13
Alth ough  Con gres s e xpres sly defines  som e of CERCLA’s
s t a tu tory terms, 14 Congr ess  did n ot clar ify wha t is  me an t b y th e
t e rm “a r ranged for .” “In t er p r e t at ion of this  ter m, h owever, is
crit ical” to a d et er min at ion of liabilit y.15
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16. S ee Montalvo, 84 F.3d at 406 (“[C]ourts h ave a t times  s t rugg led  wi th  the
con tours o f ‘a r ranger ’ l iability un der § 107(a )(3).”); Unit ed St at es v. New  Cast le
Coun ty , 727 F. Su pp. 854, 871 (D. Del. 1989) (“Congress d id not  . . . il lumina te the
tr ail  to t he  in te nd ed  me an in g of a rr an ger  st at us  an d li ab ilit y.”).
17. Quaker  State Minit-Lube, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fu nd In s. Co., 868 F. Supp.
1278, 1332 (D. Ut ah  1994) (emp ha sis a dded ). 
18. Ekotek  S it e  P RP  C om m. v. S elf,  932 F. Supp. 1328, 1336 (D. Utah  1996)
(emph asis  added) (quoting Amcast Indus.  Corp. v. D e t r ex,  2 F .3d  746 , 751  (7 th  Ci r .
199 3)).  Although both cases were hea rd in th e Uni t e d  St a t es  Dis t r ic t  Cour t  of  Utah ,
the judges in the t wo cases were different. The Quaker  S tate opinion was wr itten  by
Chief Ju dge Patr ick F. Kelly, while the Ekotek  opinion it is being compar ed to was
written  by Judge John  W.  Lungst rum.
19. Because liability is  so un certa in, som e litiga nt s ma y be un willing to  t ake a
chance in cour t a nd t hu s agr ee to a n out  of cour t set tle ment , even th ough t heir
l iab il it y unde r  t he  Ac t  is  not  c lea r .
20. S ee W. P A G E  KE E T O N  E T  A L ., P ROSSER & KE E T O N  ON  T H E  LA W  OF  TO R T S  § 78,
a t  556  (5t h e d. 1 984 ) (“[T]he re  sh ou ld b e s om e r at he r w ell -un d e r stood  r equ i r emen t s
to be satisfied so tha t th ere can  be some degree of predictabi lity ab out  wh en  st ri ct
l iab il it y will be a pplicab le. Th is will pr even t u nn ecessa ry lit igat ion.”). 
To ad d t o th e confusion, a s cour ts  na tion wide s t rugg le  to
in te rpret  t he t er m “ar ra nge d for,”16 th e positions ta ken  by
individual cour t s m ay ch ange over  t im e. F or  exa mple, in  one
act ion  involving t he E kote k sit e in U ta h , th e feder al d ist rict
cour t  in  Utah  s ta ted  tha t  “[in ] en a cting CERCLA, Congress
made  th e pu blic policy decision  t o place t he burde n  of the cos t
of rem edying environm ent al  da ma ge up on ‘re spon sible p ar tie s,’
an  apt ly-na med class d efined by Con gress in sweeping terms,
wi thou t regard to individual  in ten t, expecta tion , guilt y
kn owledge  or  degr ee  of negligen ce.”17 Approximat ely two years
l a te r , in  anot h e r  case  in volvi ng t he E kotek  si t e, t he cou r t
reasoned tha t  “requiring intentional action is consist ent  with
the plain la ngua ge of th e sta tu te” and t ha t “in order to hold a
person res pon sible  for  a r ranger  lia bil it y, t he p er son  m ust have
in tended  to ‘get  rid  of its h aza rd ous w as te s.’”18 Cour t s
a t t e m p t in g t o  i n t e r p r e t  C E R C L A’s  l a n gu a g e a r e
un der st an da bly confused  by  it s  language an d ma y be persu aded
more by a lit igan t ’s  a r gumen ts  as  to how t he la ngu age s hou ld
be  const rued  than  by p r ior  de cis ion s of t he cou r t .
Unce r t a in ty in how court s interpret a rra nger liability under
CERCLA can  lead to un fa i r s et t l emen t s19 or excess ive
litiga tion 20 because  so m uch is  a t  st ake. L it iga t ion  cost s for
CERCLA act ion s a re s ign ifica n t . Mor e t han  one  th ir d of t he
money s p en t  on Super fund sit es by th e privat e sector is spen t
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21. S ee Robins , supra  note 15, at 213 n.189 (“More than  one third of the 11.3
billi on  dollars spent  on Superfund sites by the pr ivate sector th rough 1991 funded
litigat ion .”); see also 126 CO N G. RE C . 31,970 (1980) (concluding that  CERCLA’s
vagueness and inconsisten cies would mak e the st atu te “a w e lf a re a nd  re lief a ct for
la wye rs ”).
22. S ee Keith Schneider , E PA Ann ounces New Steps to Prod Cleanup of Wastes,
N.Y. TI M E S, Oct. 3, 199 1, at  A1. 
23. S ee Chr istoph er J . Nowicki, A S tep B ack  From  Ch evr on? An Analysis of
Kelley v. EPA, 9 ADMIN . L.J . AM . U. 221, 226 n.25 (1995) (citing R eport  on Defense
P lan t Wa st es, BU S . P U B . IN C ., Ma r.  13,  199 5).
24. S ee Payson R. Pea body, T am in g CE R CL A: A P ropo sal  to R esolv e th e T ru st ee
“Owner” Liability Quand ary, 8 ADMIN . L.J . AM . U. 405, 422 n.62 (1994) (“High er s ite
c leanup cost s, s ome  ap pr oach ing  one  billi on d olla rs , ar e be comin g m ore  common place.”
(citing AL F R E D E. LI G H T, CERCLA LAW AND P ROCEDURE  232  (199 1))).
25. S ee Nowicki, supra  note 23, at  226 n.25.
26. CERCLA provides that liability is that “standar d of liability which  obtain s
under  [section 311 of the F edera l Water  Pollution Contr ol Act].” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32)
(199 4).  “Section 311 of the Feder al Wate r Pollut ion Cont rol Act  has  been  in t e rp ret ed
as imposin g str ict liabilit y.” United  Sta tes v. Mia mi Dru m Se rv.,  Inc., No. 85-0038-
Civ-Aronovit z, 1986 U.S.  Dist. LE XIS 1 6501 , at  *9 (S.D . Fl a. D ec. 12 , 198 6); see als o,
e.g., Pennsylvan ia  v. Union  Gas Co., 491 U .S. 1, 53 n.5 (1989) (Scalia, J ., concurr ing
in  pa r t , d is sen t i n g i n  part ) (“Section 9607 is a strict-liability provision.”); United
Stat es v. Monsant o Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he overwhelming body
of precedent .  . .  has interpreted section 107(a) as establis h ing a  s t r ic t  li abi li t y
sch em e.”). S t r ict  l iab il ity  “means  li ability th at  is im pose d on  an  act or a pa rt  from
either  (1) an int ent  to int erfer e with  a  legally p ro tec ted  in teres t  wi thout  a  l ega l
jus tifi cat ion  for  doin g so , or  (2) a  br ea ch o f a  dut y to exer cise re ason able ca re, i.e .,
action able  neglige nce.” KEETON  ET AL ., supra note 20, § 75, at 534.
27. S ee, e.g., Aluminu m Co. v. Beazer E a st ,  Inc .,  124 F .3d  551 , 562  (3d  Ci r .
1997) (“Under  CERCLA, four types of ‘covered persons’ are h e ld  jo in t ly an d sever ally
liable  as ‘resp onsible  par ties .’”); Unit ed S ta te s v. C ons e r v a tion Chem. Co., 619 F.
Supp. 162, 191 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (“[L]iability u nder  . . . CERCLA . . . is joint a nd
severa l wher e th e ha rm  ar ising from  a r elease or t hr ea te ne d r ele as e of a h aza rd ous
subst ance is i nd ivis ibl e.”).  CERCLA’s  jo in t  and  severa l  li abi li ty s tandard has developed
th rough  case la w since Con gress  “deliberat ely left the ta sk  of ar ti cul at in g su ch a
s t anda rd to th e cour ts.” Lyn da J . Oswa ld, New Directions in  Joint and  Several
Liabili ty Under CERCLA?, 28 U.C. DA V IS  L. RE V. 299, 312 (1995). “[V]irtually every
cour t  tha t  has  examined the  i ssue  has  held  such  defendant s  jo in t ly an d sever ally
liable.” Id .  a t  304 n.12. Alt ho ug h j oin t a nd  se ver al  lia bil it y wi ll n ot b e im pos ed  if t he
de fendan t can prove the harm is divisible, once hazardous wastes ha ve commin gled
it  i s  a lmost impossible to determin e the a mount  of environmen tal ha rm cau sed by
each  par ty. S ee O’Neil v. P icillo, 883 F.2d  176, 179 (1st  Cir. 19 89). 
on lit iga t ion .21 CERCLA cleanu p operat ions ta ke an  averag e of
seven  to t en  yea r s22 an d cost a n a ver age  of thir ty m illion
dollars.23 It  is not uncommon for site cleanups t o cost almost
one billion dollars,24 an d a t s ome sit es, clea nups  could  rea ch
fift y billion dollars.25 Sin ce CERCLA lia bilit y is  st r ict 26 and
app lied jointly  a n d sever ally, 27 even s light  var iat ions in  th e
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28. S ee, e.g., infra text  Pa rt  V.A.3 (explain ing h ow differences in  lan g u age used
by cou rt s cou ld r es ul t i n a  fin din g of lia bil it y in  on e cou rt , bu t n ot t he  oth er ).
29. Pen nsylva nia  v. U ni on  Ga s C o., 4 91 U .S.  1, 2 0 (19 88).
30. United  St at es  v. C or dova  Ch em . Co. , 11 3 F .3d  572 , 58 4 (6 th  Cir . 1997)
(Merr itt , J ., disse nt ing), vacated and reman ded on other grounds su b n om . United
Stat es v. Best foods, 118 S. Ct . 1876 (1998 ); see Ekotek  Site PRP  Comm. v. Self, 948
F . Supp. 964, 1000 n.8 (D. Utah 1996) (noting the need for  fede ra l in te rp re ta tion  of
CERCLA du e t o th e st at ut e’s “nat iona l ap plica tion , th e n eed  for fa ir ne ss t o s im i la r ly
situat ed pa r t ie s , and  the poss ib il it y tha t CE RCLA’s pur poses would be frustr ated by
s t at e law ”); In re Acus hn et  Rive r,  675  F.  Su pp . 22,  31 (D . Ma ss . 198 7) (“On e ca n
ha rdly  im agi ne  a fe der al p rog ra m m ore  dem an din g of na tion al  u n iformi ty than
environmenta l protection.”); United St ates v. Chem -Dyne Corp., 5 72 F. Supp. 802, 809
(S.D. Oh io 19 83) (“[T]h e d eli ne at ion  of a u n iform federa l rule of decision is consistent
with  the  l eg is la t ive  h is tory  and policies  of CERCLA . . . .”). In United States v.
Kim bell Foods, Inc.,  440 U.S . 715 (1979), the Court noted that when t here is a
federa l p rogram tha t  requ i res na t iona l un ifor mi ty,  th e Con st itu tion  all ows u nifor m
federa l rules of decisions. Courts deciding wheth e r  federal common law applies must
consider, am ong ot he r t hin gs, t he  ne ed for  na tion al u nifor mit y on t he is sue . See id.
a t  728.
31. 126 CO N G. RE C . 31,965 (198 0); see al so E kot ek , 948 F . Sup p. at  1000 n .8
(noting  CE RCL A’s “na tion al a ppl icat ion,  th e n eed  for fairness  t o similarly situated
parties, and the possibility that CERCLA’s purposes would be f rus t r a t ed by s t a t e
la w”). But see Redwing Car riers, In c. v. Saralan d Apts., 94 F.3d 1489, 1502 (11th  C ir .
1996) (“ ‘I see no necessity to create federal common law in this area to guard against
the risk  th at  sta tes  will crea te s afe h aven s for pollu ter s.’” (qu oting Ans pec Co. v.
Johnson  Con tr ols , In c., 9 22 F .2d  124 0, 1 250  (6t h C ir . 19 91))).
32. S ee, e.g., supra  no t e 13 and  accompanying t ext .
ma nn er  court s d et ermin e a r ranger  lia bil it y h ave s ign ifica n t
ram ifications for plaintiffs and defendants.28
Environmenta l pr oble ms a re “often  not  su sce pt ibl e of a  loca l
solut ion.”29 E limina t in g  the d anger s r es u lt in g fr om haza rdou s
w a ste disp osal r equ ires  “a n at iona l solut ion to a  na tion wide
pr oblem.”30 Without un iform national standa rds, businesses
tha t  disp ose of haza rd ous s ubs ta nces could  skir t lia bility by
locatin g “pr ima rily in  s t a t es  wi th mor e len ien t la ws.”31 Liabilit y
un der  CERCLA should depend on  the  natu re  of t he  act ivi ty
engaged  in,  ra the r  than  the fede ra l cou r t  in  w h ich  t he act ion is
b rough t . Yet CERCLA is a federa l sta tu te t ha t, in t he eight een
years  it  has b een  in  effect , h as n ot  de velope d a  un ifor m
approach  to a rr an ger  liab ility. 32 Th er efor e, t he t im e is  r ipe for
Con gress  or th e Supr eme Cour t t o expressly define the t erm
“ar ra nged for.” However, even a bsen t Con gres siona l or
Supreme Cour t  act ion  cla r ify ing  the i ssue,  lower  cour t s  shou ld
take a  unifor m  ap pr oach in  det erm inin g ar ra nger  liabilit y
un der CE RCLA.
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33. Quaker  Stat e Minit-Lube, Inc. v. Firem an’s Fund  Ins. Co., 868 F. Supp.
1278, 133 2 (D.  Ut ah  199 4).
34. “Facility” is defined as:
(A) any building, str uctu re, in sta llation , equipm ent , pipe or pip eline
(including any pipe into a sewer  or publicly owned treat ment  works), well,
p it , pon d, la goon,  im pou nd m e n t , dit ch, l an dfill,  st ora ge con ta ine r, m otor
vehicle, ro llin g st ock,  or  ai rcr aft , or  (B) any sit e  or  a r ea  where  a  haza rdous
subst ance has been  deposited,  s tored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise
come  to b e loca te d; bu t d oes n ot in clud e a ny  cons um er  pr odu ct in consumer
use or an y vessel.
42 U. S.C . § 96 01(9 ) (199 4).
35. Haza rdous su bst an ces  “include a br oad r an ge of pollut an ts, ch emica ls, an d
This  Com men t  pr ovid es  su ch  a  un ifor m app roach . Par t II  of
th i s Com m ent  exa min es  the cu r ren t  st anda rd of l ia bil it y for
a r r ange r s un der  CER CLA. Pa rt  III  ar gue s  t h a t  including an
in ten t  req uir eme nt  for ar ra nger s is consis ten t wit h t he
s t a tu tory language of CERCLA. It also rea sons  th at  st rict
liabilit y sh ould on ly ap ply a ft e r  t he par ty ha s been det erm ined
to be a  re spon sible p er son. P a r t  IV proposes a  defin it ion  of the
t e rm “arr anged for” that  should be expr essly en act ed in to
CERCLA by C ongr es s.  Par t  IV a l so a r gues tha t  a  s t atu tory
definit ion would be the b es t  met hod of r em ovin g t he con fusion
tha t  r esu l t s when  cour t s  make det e rmina t ions  of a r ranger
liabili t y . Two hypothe t ica l s a re  prov ided  to i llust ra te  how the
definit ion would be  us ed by cour ts  ma kin g liabilit y
determinat ions. Part  V advocates th at un til Congress en a ct s
clear  st at ut ory lan gua ge, court s sh ould a dopt  a m an agea ble
mult i factor  a n a lysis t o det er min e a rr an ger  liab ility t ha t
consider s (1) whet her  th e  t r a nsaction involved the sa le of a
usefu l pr odu ct , (2) w het her  the p ar ty gener a ted  the h aza rdou s
substa nce, and (3) whether th e party actually participated in
the decision t o dispose of or t rea t t he  haza rdous  subst ance . Pa r t
VI conclude s by exp la ining that th is multifactor test pr ovides
an  an swer  to t he  am bigui tie s su rr oun din g ar ra nge r lia bilit y.
II. CE RCLA’S  ST AN D AR D  OF  LI A B I L I T Y
“In  ena cting CERCL A, Con gr es s m ade  the p ubli c pol icy
de cis ion  to p lace  the burden  of the  cos t  of r emedying
environm ent al  d a m age up on ‘re spon sible p ar tie s’ . . . .”33 In
order to esta blish a p rim a facie case of CERCLA lia bilit y, a
pla int iff m u s t  pr ove t ha t (1) t he  sit e is a  facility, 34 (2) a release
or  th rea tened release of a hazardous substance has occurred,35
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other  s u b st a n ces.” Ekot ek S ite P RP Com m. v. Se lf, 881 F. S upp . 1516, 1524  (D. Uta h
199 5); see also 42 U .S. C. § 9 601 (14) (1 994 ).
36. Action s for cost recovery under CERCLA can be brought in  two different
ways, depending upon wh o is initiating the su it. “CERCLA is  design ed to en coura ge
pr iva t e par ties t o assu me t he fin a n c ia l responsibility of cleanup by allowing them to
seek  recovery fr om oth ers .” Key Tr on ic Corp. v. Unit ed Sta tes, 511 U.S. 809, 819 n.13
(1994 ). “[A] section  107 a ction  br ough t for  re cover y of cost s m ay b e br ough t on ly by
i nnocen t  part ies t h a t  ha ve u nd er ta ke n cle an -up s.” Ne w Ca st le Cou nt y v. H all ibu rt on
Nus Corp., 111 F.3d  1116, 1120 (3d Cir. 1997). Section 107 actions “historically [have]
been used by governments t o  r ecover  cost s in cur re d in  th e clea n-u p of h aza rd ous
site s.” Id . at 1 123. “An action br ought  by a pot ent ially re spons ible per son is  by
necessi ty a  sect ion  113 act ion  for  con t r ib u t ion .” Id . at 1120. “A section 107 cost
r ecove ry ac tion  imposes  st r ict l iability on potentially responsible persons for costs
associated with  haza rdous was te clean-up  an d sit e re med iat ion.” Id . at 1120-21. In
compar i son , section 113 contribution claims allow the court to “allocate response costs
among liable pa rt ies us ing s uch equ itable factors as the court determ ines are
a ppr opria te.” 42 U .S. C. § 9 613 (f )(1) (19 94);  see, e.g.,  Un it ed  Sta t e s  v.  Miami Drum
Ser v., Inc., N o. 85-0038-Civ-Aronovit z, 1986 U .S. Dist. L EXIS 16501 , a t  *16  (S .D.  F la .
Dec.  12,  198 6).
37. S ee Ekotek  Site  PRP  Comm . v. Self, 932 F . Sup p. 1328, 13 32 (D. Ut ah
199 6).
38. “Disposa l” is defined as:
the discha rge, d eposit , injecti on , du mp in g, s pil lin g, le ak in g, or  pla cin g of a ny
solid wa st e or  ha zar dou s wa st e in to or  o n  a n y l a nd or  wa te r s o th at  su ch
solid wa st e or  ha za rd ou s w as te  or  an y con st it ue nt  th er eof m ay  en t e r  the
envi ronmen t or b e em itt ed i nt o th e air or discharged into any waters,
i ncluding ground waters.
42 U. S.C . § 69 03(3 ) (1994). Disp osa l “inclu des  not  only  th e in iti al i nt rod uct ion of
con taminan t s o n t o a  p roperty but a lso the spreadin g of contamina nts du e to
subsequen t  a c tivity.” Unit ed St at es v. CDMG Rea lty Co., 96 F.3d  706, 719 (3d Cir.
199 6).  
39. “Trea tmen t” is defined as:
any met hod, te chniqu e, or pr ocess, includin g neu tr alizat ion, design ed to
change the ph ysical, chemical, or biological character o r composi t ion  of  any
haza rdous was te so as  to neu t ra lize su ch w as te  or s o as  to r en der  su ch
was te nonha zardous, safer for tra nsport, am enable for recovery, amen a ble
for  storage, or reduced in  volu me . Su ch t er m i nclu des  an y act ivit y or
p rocess ing des ign ed t o cha ng e t he  ph ysica l form  or ch emi cal com posi tion  of
haza rdous waste so as to render it  nonhazardous.
42 U. S.C . § 69 03(3 4) (19 94).
(3) the  release or  th re a t en ed r ele ase  has ca use d t he p la in t iff t o
in cur  certa in response costs,36 and (4 ) the d efenda nt  in  qu es t ion
is a  r espon sible person, as  defined by the s ta tu te. 37 There  a re
four  cla ss es  of res pon sible  pe r son s un der  CE RCL A: (1) t he
cur ren t own er s a nd op er a tors of a  facilit y, (2) p er sons  who
former ly owned  or oper at ed t he fa cili t y a t  the  t ime  of the
disposal of hazardous substan ces, (3) persons wh o arranged for
the disposal38 or t rea tm ent39 of h az ar dous subs ta nces, and (4)
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40. S ee Ekotek , 93 2 F . Su pp . a t 1 332  (em ph as is a dd ed ).
41. United  States v. Alcan Aluminum  Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 720 (2d Cir. 1 993 );
see also New Castle County, 111 F.3d at  1120 n.2 (“A person wh o can su ccessfully
establ ish a de fense  un der  section  107(b) is not  a pot ent ially r espon sible pe rson .”
(cita tion s om it te d)).
42. S ee 42 U .S.C . § 960 7(b) (199 4); see als o Redwing  Car r i er s, Inc.  v.  Sa ra l and
Apts.,  94 F.3d 1489, 1507 (11t h Cir. 1996) (discussing the app lication of the thr ee
possible  a ffirma tive d efens es). Th e first  two de fense s ar e ra rely in voked. See id .
De fendan t s ra i s ing  the  th ird -party d efen se a re  re qu ir ed t o pr ove: (1) “th ey d id n ot
con t r ibu te to t he  cont am in at ion ”; (2) “the y we re  not  in  a d ir ect  or ind ir ect  con t rac tua l
rela tions hip  wi th  any p er son  wh o .  . .  ca used  the c on tamin a t ion”; (3 ) “t hey exercised
due care throughout”; and (4) “[t]hat th ey protected against those acts and om issions
of th e pollut ing per sons, a nd t he conse quen ces of those a cts a nd om ission s , t h a t  were
foreseeable.” Un ited S ta tes v. Cor dova Ch em. Co., 113 F .3d 572, 593-94 (6th  Cir.
1997) (Merr itt , J ., disse nt ing), vaca ted  an d r em an ded  on ot her  grou nd s su b n om .
United  St at es  v. B es tfoo ds , 11 8 S . Ct . 18 76 (1 998 ).
43. S ee, e.g., Sm ith  La nd  & Im pr ove m ent Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86,
89 (3d C ir . 19 88) (“ Th e de fen ses  en um er at ed i n s ect ion  9607(b) are n ot exclusive in
su it s for contr ibut ion.”). 
44. Ekotek , 932 F. Supp. a t 1336.
45. Id . at  1335 (qu otin g Dougla s Coun ty v. Gou ld, In c ., 871 F. Supp. 1242, 1247
(D. Neb. 1 994)). For a  discus sion of th e us eful pr oduct  doctr ine, see infra Par t  V.A.
46. S ee supra no te 26 and  accompanying t ext .
47. S ee supra no te 27 and  accompanying t ext .
48. S ee, e.g., Un ited S ta tes v. Alcan  Alumin um  Corp., 990 F .2d 711, 716 (2d Cir .
1993) (“In pa ssin g CERCLA Congr ess faced t he u nen viable choice of ena cting a
legislat ive scheme that  would be somewh at  un fair  to ge ne ra tor s of h aza rd ous
subs tan ces or on e t ha t w ould  un fair ly bu rd en  th e t axp ayi ng  pu blic.”); O’Neil v.  Pi cillo,
883 F . 2d 176, 179 (1st  Cir. 1989) (recognizin g th at  CERCLA “may often  res ult  in
de fendan t s payin g for mor e th an  th eir s ha re of th e ha rm ”); Joh n M. H yson, “Fairness”
t r anspor t e r s of haza rdous  was te.40 This Comment  limits it s
discu ssion  to those per sons who a rr an ged for t he d isposa l or
tr eat men t of a haza rdous s ubst an ce.
A person deemed to be a responsible party may escape
CERCLA lia bil it y by demonst ra t in g “by a  pr ep onde rance of t he
evide nce th e existence of one of th e th ree [followin g st at ut ory]
a ffi rmat ive defenses”:41 (1) an  act  of God, (2) an  act  of war , or
(3) an  act  or  omission  of a  t h ird  pa r ty.42 Ove r  t im e, a dd it ion a l
judi-cially created defenses have developed.43 For  exa mp le, th e
usefu l product defense is “a  fixtu re  of CERCLA jurispr uden ce”44
and thus i t  is  we ll r ecogn ized t ha t  “CERCLA liabil it y wi ll n ot
a t t ach  i f a  t r ansact ion  in volve s t he s a le of a  new use ful
p roduct . ”45
Ear ly court  decisions  held  th at  CERC LA imposes  st rict
liab ility, 46 jointly an d seve r a lly, upon responsible part ies.47
More r ecen t ly , some  commenta tor s  and cour ts  h ave quest ioned
whet her  liability deter minat ions u nd er C ERCL A ar e fair .48 De
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and J oint  and S everal Liability in Governm ent Cost Recovery Actions Un der CER CLA ,
21 H ARV. E N V T L. L. RE V. 137, 143 (1997) (“CERCLA’s basic liability scheme imposes
l iab il it y on  a  bas is  t ha t  i s i n co n sist en t w ith  th e n otion s of cu lpa bilit y an d ca us at ion
tha t  un derlie  common la w prin ciples of liabilit y. For that r eason, it is often said that
the basic liability sch eme  of CERCLA is u nfair .”); Ja y San dvos, Comm ent , C E R CL A
Ar ran ger Liabili ty in the Eighth Circui t : United St ates v. TIC Indu stries , 24 B.C.
E NVTL . AF F . L. RE V. 863, 864 (1997) (“One  fundamenta l p rob lem of  CERCLA
int er pr et at ion  is how t o ha rm onize CE RCLA’s br oad sch eme  of str ict, joint , an d
severa l liability with the prima ry canons of torts an d corp ora ti ons  la w on  wh ich  th e
s t a tu t e over la ys. ”).
49. S ee, e.g., supra note 13.
50. S ee supra  note 13.
51. 962 F. 2d  281  (2d C ir . 19 92).
52. S ee id . at 283-84.
53. S ee id . at 283, 284 n.3.
54. S ee id . at 284 n .3.
55. S ee id . at 282.
56. S ee id . at 284.
sp it e these criticisms, this Comment  demonstrates t hat  st r ict
liabilit y can  be ap plied in  a m an ner  th at  is fair  an d is s till
cons is t en t  w ith  the s t a tu tory  l anguage  and pu rpose of t he  Act .
III. AR R A N G E R  LI A B I L I T Y, ST R I C T  LI A BI L I T Y A N D  IN T E N T
A. A S plit Among the Circuits
 In  the past  t e n  yea rs  sever al fed er al cour ts  ha ve consider ed
whet her  ass essin g a pot ent ially r espon sible pa rt y’s in ten t is
congruen t  with  the  st r i ct  l iab il ity  st ructu re  of a r ranger
liab ility. 49 The courts  ha ve been un able to rea ch  a  un ifor m
conclu sion .50 For  example , in  General Electric Co. v . Aam co
Tran sm issions, In c.,51 th ree  oil com p a n ies had  en te red  in to
lease agreem ents  wit h  dealers for service stat ion operations.
The lease agreem ent s failed to specify how the dea lers wer e to
dispose of was te m otor oil.52 The  dea lers , with out  receivin g
ad vice from t he oil comp an ies, decided  to a llow a wa st e oil
business to pick u p t heir  was te oil.53 Th e d ea ler s d id  not  pa y for
th eir  waste oil to be picked up, n or  did t he y receive
compensa t ion  for it. 54 The  was te oil was t aken  to a st orage site,
where it  eventu ally leaked i n to th e soil, su rfa ce wat er , an d
groundwate r of a fresh wat er w etla nd.55 In  an  act ion  for
cont r ibu t ion , th e pr ima ry is su e wa s wh eth er t he oil companies
could be held liable as arra ngers.56 The  Second Cir cuit  Cour t  of
Appea l s rea soned  th at  res pons ible pa rt ies a re lia ble “regardless
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 3\ F I N A L \ R E G - F IN . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
1241] ARRANGE R LIABILITY UNDE R CERCLA 1251
57. Id . at  285  (em ph as is a dd ed ).
58. S ee id. at  288 . In  fin din g t ha t t he  oil com pa ni es  wer e n ot l ia ble , t he  cou r t
noted  tha t  t he  oi l compan ies  had no t  taken  pa r t  i n  t he d i sp os a l of the wa ste oil a nd
tha t  they were n ot obligated to exercise control over their dealers’ waste oil disposal
practices.
59. 100 F. 3d  122 7 (6t h C ir . 19 96).
60. S ee id . at 1231.
61. S ee id. at 1230.
62. S ee id .
63. S ee id .
64. S ee id . at 1230-31.
65. S ee id . at 1233-34.
66. S ee Un it ed S ta te s v.  Aam co Tr an sm iss ion s, I nc. , 962 F .2d 281, 285 (2d C ir .
199 2).
67. F o r fur the r  d iscussion of the approaches ta ken by th e other circuits, see
supra  note 13.
of intent.”57 Ther efore,  the  cour t  d id  not  cons ider  t he  in t en t  of
t he oil com pa nies  wh en  it  held  tha t  the oil  compa nies  were n ot
liable as arr angers.58
In  contrast,  th e Sixth Circuit Court  of Appeals interpreted
ar ra nger  liabilit y in Unit ed S tates v. Cello-Foil Products, Inc.,59
as requ i r ing  an  in ten t  to en ter  in to an  a r rangement  for  the
disposa l of hazardous substan ces.60 The defendant  in this case
bough t  virgin solvent in fifty-five gallon reus able drum s from
Thomas Solvent.61 When t he defen da nt  was  finish ed wit h t he
drum s, th e dru ms wer e  r et u rned to Thomas  and  the defendan t
was cred it ed  for  t he  amoun t  of t he  drum depos it .62 For  severa l
years , Thomas  empt ied an y cont ent s remain ing in  the re tu rned
dru m s onto the ground.63 La ter ,  it  was  d iscovered tha t
hazardous waste had con tamina ted the  pr imary  publ ic wa ter
su pply of Batt le Cre ek, Mich iga n .  Thoma s’ propert y, ther efore,
was designat ed as a Superfund sit e .6 4  The  cour t  r emanded the
case for  fu r the r fi ndings  s ince  the t r ia l  cou r t  ha d  n ot
deter mined  whether th e defendan t  had th e intent required to
have arr anged for disposal of the ha zardous substances.6 5  H ad
the Cello-Foil Products court  su bscrib ed t o th e sa me r eas oning
on in ten t  tha t  was descr ibed in  Aam co,66 t he Cello-Foil Products
court  would not have found it necessary to remand th e case.67
B. CE R CL A’s S ta tu tory L an gu age is  Con si st en t W it h  an  In ten t
R equ irem ent
 Incorpora t ing an  int ent  req uir eme nt  int o an  exam ina t ion  of
whet her  a  pa r ty has  a r ranged  for  disp osa l or  t r ea tmen t  of
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68. Babb it t  v . Swee t  Home  Chap te r , 515 U.S. 68 7, 711 (1995) (O’Connor, J .,
con cur ri ng ).
69. Cello-Foil Prods., 100 F.3d at 1231 (citations omitt ed). “[G]enera l terms
following  sp ecifi c te rm s s ho ul d b e u nd er st ood u nd er  th e r ub ri c of t he s pe cific  te r m .”
Id . This canon of statutory interpretation is known as ejusd em  gener is.  S ee Pea body,
supra  note 24 , a t  441 n.189.
70. Exx on  Corp. v. H un t, 475  U.S. 35 5, 371 (1986). 
71. Chatham St ee l Cor p. v . Br own , 85 8 F . Su pp . 11 30,  113 8 (N .D.  Fl a.  199 4).
72. S ee id. This is  in ke epin g wit h oth er a rea s of law in wh ich str ict liabilit y
applies. For example, th e RE S T AT E ME N T (SE C O N D) O F  TORTS  § 519  im pos es  st ri ct
l iab il it y only after an  activity is deemed to be “abnormally dan gerous. ” To de termine
ha zar dous  su bst an ces is congr ue nt  wit h t he  st at ut ory la ngu age
and does n ot fru st ra te t he s tr ict liab ility  na t ure of CERCLA.
“S t r ict  liab ility mea ns liability with out r egard  to fault; it does
not  norm ally mea n liability for every consequen ce, however
remote , of one ’s condu ct.”68 Even  th ough liability un der
CER CLA is st rict  liab ility,
it  w ou l d b e  er r or  for  u s  not  to r ecogn ize t he  ind ispe ns ab le r ole
t h a t  s ta te  of  min d m ust  play in  dete rm ining w h e t h e r  a  p a r t y
h a s  “ot h e rw is e a r r a n ge d  for  d is p os a l . . . of h a z ar d ou s
su bst an ces.”
W e de r ive  the  in t en t  e l emen t  from  t h e  ca n o n s o f s t a t u t or y
cons tr u ction . “Oth e rwise  a r r a n g ed ” i s a  g en e r a l t e r m  following
in  a  s e r i e s  t w o  s p ecific te rm s . . . . All  of th es e t er m s in dica te
t h a t  t he  cour t  m us t  i nqu i r e  in to  wha t  t r a nsp i r ed  be t w e e n  t h e
pa r t i e s a n d  w h a t  t h e  pa r t ie s  h a d i n  m in d  w it h  r eg a r d t o
dis pos ition  of t h e h az ar dou s su bst an ce. Th er efore , inclu din g
a n  int en t r equ ire m en t in t o t h e  “o t h e r w i se  a r r a n g e ” c on c e p t
logically  follows t he  st ru ctu re  of th e a rr an ger  liab ility
pr ovisi on .69
There is no need “to depart from th e language of the sta tu te”70
when  incorpora t ing an  int en t r equ ire me nt . Alth ough  th e t ext  of
§ 9607(a )(3) does not  us e “the  word s ‘int en t,’ ‘kn owingly,’
‘willfully’ or a ny oth er m otivat iona l ter m . . . [g]iven its  pla in
meaning , the ve rb ‘to a r range’ ar gu ably  im pl ies  a  pe r son  has
the in ten t  to accompli sh  tha t  which  they ar e  ‘a r r angin g’ to
do.”71
C. Strict Liability Only Applies After it is Determin ed the
Person is a Responsible Party
Str ict liability under  CERCLA only a t t aches to persons  who
are deter mined  to be respons ible part ies as defined  by t he Act .72
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wheth er  an  act ivit y is “a bn orm all y da ng er ous ,” th e Re st at em en t li st s se ver al fa ctor s
to consider , includin g:
(a)  existence of a high degree of risk of some ha rm t o the per son , la nd , or
cha tt e ls of others;
(b) likelihood tha t th e har m th at r esults from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate th e risk by the exer cise of reasonable care;
(d) extent t o which the activity is not a ma tter  of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of th e a ctiv ity  to t he  pla ce wh er e it  is ca rr ied  on; a nd
(f ) ext en t t o wh ich i ts  val ue  to t he  comm un ity  is ou twe ighed  by  it s
dange rous attributes.
S ee id. § 520. 
73. Cello-Foil Prods., 100 F.3d at 1232.
74. Id .; see also Ekotek Sit e PRP Com m. v. Self, 881 F. Supp. 1516, 1527 (D.
Utah  1995) (“And while the d efendants  repeat edly emphasize th a t . . .  t hey had  no
kn owledge of th e con dit ions  of th e E kot ek  facili ty,  th is is  irr ele van t t o th e schem e of
str ict lia bil it y cr ea te d b y CE RCL A.”).
Ther efore,  “examin ing  sta te  of mind or  asce r ta in ing int en t  a t
the cont r a ct ,  agreement , or  other  type of a r rangement  st age
does not u nder mine t he st rict liability na tu re of CERCLA. The
in ten t  inquir y is geared only towar ds det erm ining whet her  th e
pa r ty in qu est ion is a  pote nt ially lia ble pa rt y.”73 It  is not  u n t il
after
a  p a r t y i s d e te r m in e d  to h a ve  t h e  r equ i s i t e  i n t en t  t o  be  an
a r r a n g er , [t h a t ] s t r ict  l i ab i li t y  t akes  e f f ec t .  I f an  a r r a ngem en t
h a s  been  m ade ,  t ha t  pa r ty  i s  l i a b le  fo r  d a m a g e s c a u s ed  b y  t h e
d i sposa l r e ga r dle ss  of th e p ar ty ’s in te n t t h at  th e d am ag es  n ot
occu r.  M or e ov er , a  pa rt y ca n  be r es pon sib le for  “a r r a n g in g  fo r”
disp osa l, e ve n  w h en  i t h a s  n o cont rol ove r t he  pr ocess le ad ing
t o th e r ele as e of su bst an ces. T h er efor e, once  it  ha s  been
demons t r a t ed  t h a t  a  p a r t y p os s es s ed  t h e  r eq u is i t e  in ten t  to  be
a n  a r r a n ge r , t h e p a r t y  ca n n o t  e s ca p e  li a b il it y by claimin g th at
it  had  no  in t en t  t o  have  t h e  w a s t e dis pose d in  a p ar ticu lar
ma nn er  o r  a t  a  pa r t i cu la r  s i t e . 74
If the  t r ansact ion  includes an  a r r angemen t  for  t he  ul t ima te
d isposa l of a  haza rdous  subst ance , CERCLA’s  s t ri ct  liability is
imposed.
IV. A DE F I N IT IO N  O F  TH E  TE R M  “AR R A N G E D  F O R”
A. Proposed S tat ut ory La ngu age
 The most effective way to impr ove the na tion a l u n ifor m i ty
of CE RCLA’s lia bil it y det er min a t ion s for  ar ra ngers  would be for
Congress to expressly define th e ter m “a r ranged  for . ” The
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75. Proposed mod ifica ti ons  to § 9 607 (a)(3) a re  it al icized.  The  r a t iona le  beh ind
each  of th e pr opos ed m odifica t ions to the stat ute is described in subsequent footnotes.
76. S ee supra Par t III.B (reasoning tha t th e stat utory langu age is consistent
with  an  in te nt  re qu ir em en t).
77. S ee infra P ar t  V. B (discussin g policy reason s for holdin g gener at ors liab le
under  CE RCL A).
78. S ee infra  Pa rt  V.A.2 (d iscu ss in g t he  us efu l pr odu ct  doct ri ne ). It  is u nd er st ood
tha t  the wording of this portion of the stat ute requires a c ou r t  to cons ide r fa ctor s
extr insic  to th e seller  to det erm ine t he se ller’s  int ent . However , th is is in a ccord with
the app roa ch ta ken  by court s. S ee, e.g., Ekotek S ite PRP  Comm. v. Self, 948 F. Supp.
994, 997 (D. Uta h 1996) (drawing a n inference th at t he defendant  intended  to get r id
of ha za rd ous  su bst an ces  from  th e low  pr ice a t w hi ch t he  p r od u ct  was sold). One
S u p re m e Court justice reasoned that  a person “is presum ed to have int en ded the
na tura l consequ ences of his d eeds.” Wash ingt on v. Davi s, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976)
(Stevens, J., concurring). Therefore, “the m ost probative evide nce  of inten t will be
objective evidence of what actu ally happened r ath er th an evidence de scr ibing the
subject ive sta te of min d of the  actor .” Id .
79. S ee infra Pa rt  V.C (d iscu ss in g t he  act ua l pa rt icip at ion  re qu ir em en t).
defin ition  would  give court s dir ection a s t o th e scope of liability
Congress inten ded un der § 9607(a)(3). This Comm ent  advocates
tha t  42  U.S.C. § 9607(a )(3) be m odi fied  to rea d a s fol lows :75
a n y person  w ho by  c on t r a c t , a g r e e m e n t , or  ot h e rw is e a r r a n ge d
for  d i sp o sa l  or  t r ea t m en t, or  ar ra n ged  wit h  a t ra n sp ort er  for
t r a n s p or t  for  d is p os a l or  t r ea t m e n t , of h a z ar d ou s  su b s t an ces
ow n e d or p oss es se d b y su ch  p e r son , by a n y ot h er  pa rt y or
ent i ty , at  an y fa cility  or in cin er at ion  vess el owned  o r  ope ra t ed
by a n ot h e r  pa rt y or  en tit y a n d con ta in in g su ch h az ar dou s
subs t a nces .
(A)  “Arran ged for” requires  a sp ecifi c in ten t  to d isp ose of or
trea t a  h az ar d ou s su bst an ce.76
( i ) Th is  in tent  i s  presum ed i f  the  person has  gen era ted
t h e h a z a rd ou s su bst an ce as a  by-p rod u ct for  w h ich  th ere is n ot
a  v iab le  m arke t .77
( i i ) S el l ing a u sefu l p rod u ct is  n ot a n  ar ra n gem ent  for
disp os a l or  t rea tm ent ; however ,  i t  is  no t  enough  th a t  the
pr od u ct  h a v e  a n  in cid en ta l or r esid u al  va lu e to a n oth er pers on .
T h e produc t  m us t  be  o f  the  t ype tha t  i f  un avai lab le  f rom the
se l ler , th e bu yer w ou ld  n eed t o look  for  a  rep lacem ent  produc t .78
( i i i ) Ad d iti on al ly, t o h av e “ar ra n ged  for” d isp osa l or
trea tm en t  o f a  h a z a rd ou s  s u b s t a n c e,  t h e p e r so n  m u s t  h a v e
actua l ly  part ic ipat ed in  th e crucial  decis ion to  r id  i t se l f o f  the
h a z ar d ou s  su bst an ce.79 T h e pers on  n eed n ot  kn ow  th e det ai ls of
t h e tra n sa ction s ,  ( i .e . , locat ion of  wh ere the product  is  going,
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80. Although  some cour ts  ha ve con sid er ed w he th er  th e pa rt y kn ew t he  locat ion
of the d isp osa l sit e, “[t]h e pl ain  lan gu age  of th e st at ut e doe s n ot r equ ir e k now ledge
of th e facility’s location .” Ekotek S ite  P RP  C om m . v. Self, 932 F. Supp. 1328, 1334
(D. Uta h 1996). “CERCLA does not require tha t th e arr angem ent be location  specific.”
Id . at  1335  n.5 ; see als o Flor ida P ower & L ight  Co. v. Allis Cha lmer s Corp ., 893 F .2d
1313, 1318 (11 th  Cir. 1990) (reasoning that even if a man ufacturer did not decide
how, when, a nd by wh o m  a  h a za rdou s su bst an ce was  to be d isposed  of, the
man ufacturer  could still b e lia ble); O ’Neil v. P icillo, 883 F.2d 176, 182 n .9 (1st Cir .
1989) ( reason ing tha t  sin ce C ER CLA is a st rict lia bility sche me, it  is possible t o hold
de fendan t s liable ev en  i f t h ey did  not  kn ow h ow t he ir  wa st e m ad e it s wa y to t he
sit e).
Also,  courts sh ould not consider wheth er the pa rt y knew how th e substa nces
would  be disposed of becaus e it would  encoura ge part ies “to escape liability by
‘p lay ing dumb’ about how their hazardous wastes  are disp osed of.” Ekotek  Site PRP
Com m.  v. Self, 881 F. Supp. 1516, 1530 (D. Utah  1995) (quoting Chath am Steel Corp.
v. Brown, 858 F. Sup p. 1130, 1142 (N.D. Fla. 1994)).  “In sh ort , Defe nd an ts  can not
eschew th eir r espons ibilities u nder  CERCLA m erely b eca us e t he y al lege dly d id n ot
know th e loca tion  or  m e t hod s of [ the d is po ser ]’s b usin es s.” Id .  (alter at ion in or iginal)
(quotin g Ch at ha m  S teel , 85 8 F . Su pp . a t 1 142 ).
81. Although  this is a hypothetical scenario, it  is similar in many respects to
the litigat ion Fu el Pr ocessors faced in  Ekotek , 932 F . Sup p. at 1328 . See infra Par t
V.B.
m eth od  of d isp osa l),80 ra th er on ly n eed s  to ha ve part ic ipated  in
th e d ecisi on  to get  rid  of th e h az ar d ou s su bst an ce.
B. Ap plica tion  of the Prop osed S tat ut ory La ngu age
1. First hypothetical
 To illus tr at e how t his  st at ut ory defin ition w ould  give
s t ructu re to a  cour t’s a na lysis, consid er t he following
hypothe t ica l scena rio.81 ABC, a recycling business, obtains  used
motor  oi l from se rvice  st a t ions  and  other  bus inesses tha t  have
waste oil t o disp ose . ABC filter s a nd  pr ocesses t he u sed oil a nd
th en  sells  th e tr eat ed oil to bu sin esse s t ha t h ave a  us e for it.
ABC ha s a  good m ar ket  for its p rocesse d oil. XYZ buys  som e of
ABC’s processed oil to use in its business operations.
Unbek nown to ABC,  XYZ changes  it s  opera t ions a n d  n o longer
needs all th e processed oil it  bou gh t  and s o dis pos es  of th e
excess oil  on  it s pr oper ty. Se vera l yea rs la ter , XYZ has a ser ies
of hazardous  wa st e a ccident s on t he  pr oper ty. E ven tu ally t he
p roper ty is designat ed as a  Super fun d site and ABC is  su ed  for
cont r ibu t ion .
S ince th e agr eem ent  in t his  hyp oth etica l did n ot expr essly
p r ovide for  the  t r ea tment  or  d isposa l of hazardous  subs tances,
the cour t n eeds t o deter min e whet her  ABC had  “otherwise
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82. S ee supra Par t IV.A (providin g  cu r r ent s tat utory la ngua ge of 42 U.S.C.
§ 960 7(a )(3) (19 94)).
83. S ee supra Pa rt  IV.A (provid ing  pr opose d st at ut ory  lan gu age  at  su bse ction
(i)).
84. S ee supra Part  IV.A (providing proposed statut ory la ng ua ge a t s ub sect ion
(ii)).
85. S ee supra Pa rt  IV.A (providing propose d sta tu tory la ngu age a t su bsection
(ii)).
86. S ee infra  Pa rt  V.A (di scu ss in g t he  us efu l pr odu ct d oct ri ne ).
87. Although  this is a hypothetical scenario, it  is similar in many respects to
the discussion of fertilizer companies found infra Par t V.A.3.
ar ra nged for” the disp osa l or  t r ea tmen t  of the p roces se d m otor
oil.82 Since the processed motor oil was n ot genera ted by ABC
as a  by-p rodu ct  and t her e was a  via ble  market  for  t h e p roduct ,
t he re is no presu mpt ion tha t ABC had  th e requ isite int ent .83
The t ransa ct ion  app ea rs t o in volve  a  use ful product, bu t fur th er
ana lysis i s r equ i red  to ensure  tha t  i t  is  not  mer ely being
cha ract e r ized a s  a  u se fu l  p roduct .84 The cour t  would need to
inqu ire  int o th e pr ice of th e pr ocessed m otor oil and whe th er, if
it  wa s u nava ila ble , XYZ would have been required to find a
replacement  product. Sin ce at t he t ime th e tr an saction occur red
XYZ req uir ed oil for its operations, XYZ would have obtained oil
from a d iffer ent  source if it ha d not bough t t he oil from ABC.85
In  th is h ypoth etica l, th e inqu iry could s top a t t his  point  since
th e sa le of a us eful p rodu ct does  not  incu r a rr an ger  liab ility. 86
2. Second hypothetical
 To i l lust r a t e  how th is  defin it ion would be applied to a
differen t  fact  pa t t ern ,  cons ider  a  hypothe t ica l  involving a
manufactu r ing pla nt  th at  gener at es t oxic was tes  as  an
un inten ded by-p rodu ct .87 The plant has pa id for the disposa l  of
t h e toxic was tes  in t he p as t, bu t h as  recen tly en ter ed in t o an
agreeme nt  w ith  a  fe r t il izer  company to t ake the  pl ant ’s  t ox ic
wastes. The fertilizer compan y pays  a  nomina l sum for th e toxic
wastes, an d t hen  ad ds t he t oxic wast es in  low con cen t ra t ion s a s
filler  to th e fert i lize r . Th is  pr act ice con t in ues  for  a  number  of
yea r s before t he fert ilizer plant  is designat ed as a  Super fu nd
site.  The manufactu r ing p lan t  i s even tua lly sued u nder
CE RCLA t o recove r  cost s incur red  in  clea nup op er a t ion s.
Und er  th e pr oposed s ta tu te , a  court  would be gin its  an alys is
by examin ing th e agreem ent  to deter mine wh eth er its  expres s
purpose wa s t o dis pos e of t he h aza rdou s w ast es  of th e
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88. S ee supra Par t  IV.A (provid ing  cur ren t  s ta tut ory langu age of 42 U.S.C.
§ 960 7(a )(3) (19 94)).
89. S ee supra Part  IV.A (providing proposed statut ory la ng ua ge a t s ub sect ion
(i)).
90. S ee supra Pa rt  IV.A (providing propose d sta tu tory la ngu age a t su bsection
(ii)).
91. Alth ou gh  in this hypothetical the court looks at the buyer’s business, t he
inqu i ry is limited to facts that  help the court  determ ine wheth er th e t r a n sact ion  was
a  sham  for disposal. The overall focus of the inqu iry, therefore, rema ins on the in tent
of the m anu facturer  of the waste . Although courts  would  ha ve t o weigh a few facts,
t he re wou ld b e m ore  un ifor mi ty  in  th e r es ul ts  beca us e courts would a ll consider t he
s a m e type  of evidence. See supra notes 16-18 and accompan yin g te xt; see also infra
Par t  V.
92. S ee supra Pa rt  IV.A (pr ovidin g pr opos e d  st a tu tor y la ng ua ge a t s ub sect ion
(iii)).
m a n ufactu r ing p lan t .88 Accord ing  to the  fact s , th i s i s un l ikely.
However , th e court  would p res um e th at  th e ma nu factu rin g
p lan t  had t he r equis it e in ten t  to dis pos e of t he h a zardous
wast es since it was  an  un inten ded by-product for which th ere
was not  a  vi able market .89 Alth ough th e fertilizer company wa s
willing  to pay a nominal price for th e waste, th is alone  is
insuffi cien t  to make  it  a  usefu l p r od u ct .90 The fert ilizer
company was  willing t o add  th e wa st e to it s fert ilizer to add
weigh t  t o t he  product ; however , the  was te  was  not  neces sa ry for
the fertilizer. There is no indication that  the fertilizer company
would  ha ve looked for  another  product  i f th i s was te was  not
readily an d cheaply ava ilable.91 The manufactu r ing p lan t
decided it  neede d t o get  r id  of i t s hazardous wast es an d ent ered
in to th e tr an saction for tha t pu rpose.92 Ther efor e, th e
ma nu factur ing plan t would be held lia ble as a n a rr an ger.
3. Con clu sion
 T h e above hypothet icals illust ra te t he ea se in  wh ich  t h is
proposed s ta tu tory  defin it ion  could be applied by the courts.
The court s would be re qu i re d t o app ly findings  of fact  to the
s t a tu tory lan guage to de ter min e whet her  or  not  the p er son  has
ar ra nged for  d isposa l or  t r ea tment  of a  hazardous  subs tance .
There ma y be sligh t va ria tion s in  th e way  cour t s  do tha t ;
however, th e pr oposed s ta tu tor y langu age w ould h elp br ing
un iformi ty in  the ana lys is  and would infu se fair nes s in to
liabilit y dete rmina t ions since a finding of liability would depend
more upon  the a ct ivity in which the person has engaged than
which  cour t  the  case was  b rought .
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93. S ee Unit ed Sta tes v. Cello-Foil Prods., Inc., 100 F.3d 1227, 1233 (6th Cir .
1996) (“The  st a t e  of  man’s m i n d  is  a s mu ch a fact  as t he st at e of his digest ion. It is
t rue tha t [it] is very difficult to prove wha t  the  s ta te  o f a  man’s  mind a t  a  par t i cu la r
tim e is, but  if it can be  ascer ta ined it  is as m uch a  fact as  an yth ing else .” (quotin g
Ed din gton  v. F it zm au ri ce, 2 9 Ch . D.  459 , 48 3 (18 85))).
94. Id . at 1231.
95. Id . at 1233.
96. Wa sh ing ton  v. D av is,  426  U. S. 2 29,  253  (197 6) (S te ven s, J ., con cur ri ng ).
97. Cello-Foil Prods., 10 0 F .3d  at  123 2 (foot no te  om it te d).
98. United  Sta tes  v. Gor don  St affor d, I nc. , 95 2 F . Su pp . 33 7, 3 40 (N .D.  W. Va .
199 7); see also Ekotek  Site PRP  Comm. v. Self, 932 F. Supp . 1328,  1333 (D.  Utah
1996) (“Arr an ger  lia bili ty  dep en ds  on t he  fact s of ea ch case and m ust  be decided by
reviewing th e en tir e re cord.”). 
99. S ee United Sta tes v. Petersen Sa nd & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1354
(N.D. Ill . 19 92).
100. Civ. No. 2:93-0654, 19 97 U.S . Dist . LEXIS 4 413, a t  *16-17 (S.D. W. Va. J an .
27, 199 7).
V. USIN G A MU L T I F A C T O R  AP P R O A C H  T O  E ST ABLI SH  A P R I M A
F ACIE CASE
Unt il Con gr ess  gives gu ida nce on  wh at  it in te nd ed by t he
t er m  “a r ranged for ,” cour t s  wi ll  need  to con t inue  to s t r ive to
establish a  u n i form a pproach. Whether a par ty intended to
a r range for  d isposa l or treatmen t of a hazar dous substance is a
factua l i ssue93 th at  “need n ot be proven by direct evidence”94 a s
lon g as i t  can  “be in fer red  from the in di rect  act ion  of th e
pa r ties.”95 “Frequen t ly , the  mos t  p roba t ive evidence  of in ten t
will be objective evidence of wha t a ctua lly happen ed  r ath er
than  evidence describing the subjective stat e of mind of the
actor . For  norma lly the  actor  i s p r esumed to have in tended  the
na tura l consequ ences of his  deed s.”96 Du e t o the d ifficu lt y of
p roving in ten t , “in  the a bs en ce of a  cont ract  or  agr eemen t  [for
the disp osa l or  t r ea tmen t  of a  haza rdou s s ubs tance], a  cour t
must  look  to the t ota lit y of t he cir cumst ances , in clu d in g any
‘a ffi rmat ive act s  t o d ispose, ’ t o deter mine whether  the
[d]efendan t s int en de d t o en ter  in to an  a r rangem en t  for
disp osal.”97 To do th is, cour ts h ave r eviewed “the  tota l ity  of the
circumstan ces, on  a  case -by-ca se ba sis.”98 S ince  there  is  no
brigh t-lin e tes t , a  de ta iled a na lys is  of th e t r a n sact ion is
ne cessa ry. 99 A mult i factored ana lysi s i s an  order ly method of
considering the totality of the circumstances.
An examp le of a m ultifactored a n a lysis is foun d in  United
States v. Am erican Cyan am id Co.100 The i ssue in  Am erican
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101. S ee id .
102. Id . at *14.
103. S ee id .
104. S ee id . at *17.
105. This  addresses  the following factors considered  b y t he Am erican Cyanam id
cour t : (3) the par ty’s intent, (4) the purpose and inevitable con se qu en ces  of th e
t r ansact ion , (5) wheth er th e product had  value on the m ark et, (6 ) whether  there  was
a  produ ctive us e for th e sub sta nce, (8) whet her  at  an y tim e  t h e seller has disposed
of th e sub sta nce as  wast e, an d (9) wheth er a  used  produ ct is  being sold for the same
use for  wh ich  it  was  manufac tu red . See supra  not es 1 00-04  an d a ccomp an ying te xt .
106. This  addresses th e following factors considered by the Am erican Cyanam id
Cyanam id  was  whether  t r ansact ions  for  the sale of TCP and
sod ium demons t r a ted  an  a r rangem en t  for  the d ispos a l of
hazardous subs t a nces.101 The cour t  r ecognized tha t  “a
t r ansact ion  does not escape t he scope of sect ion  107 (a)(3) a nd
liability  as an a rra nger merely because it  is char acterized as a
sa le.”102 When  i t  is  unclea r  whether  a  t r ansact ion  i s a  sa le  of a
us eful, albeit h azar dous, produ ct or whet her  it i s  merely an
ar rangement for  d isposa l,  the cour t  r easoned it  was  impor tan t
t o examine all of the circumstances.103 The court list ed severa l
factors consider ed by other cour t s , including: (1 ) whether  the
pa r ty had  knowledge  of an d con t rol over  the d ispos a l, (2) w ho
owned th e haza rdou s s ubs tance a t  the t im e of d ispos a l, (3) t he
pa r ty’s in ten t , (4) t he p urpos e a nd inevi t able  conse qu en ces  of
the t r ansact ion , (5 ) whether  the p roduct  had  va lue on  the
market , (6) wh et her  ther e was a  pr odu ct ive  use  for  the
subs tance or whet her  it would be m or e pr oper  to cha ra cter ize
the substan ce as waste t o be disposed, (7) wheth er t he
subs tance wa s a  pr in cipa l bu sines s p rodu ct  or  a  by -p r od u ct, (8)
whet her  a t  any t ime the s ell er  has d ispos ed  of th e subs tance  as
wast e, and (9 ) wh et her  a  use d p rodu ct  is  be in g sold  for  the
same use for which it was ma nufactured.104 The cour t  ap plied
these factors  to the  t r ansact ions  involving TCP and  then  to the
t ransact ions  involving sod ium.
The multifactor approach adop t ed by the Am erican
Cyanam id  cou r t  is useful in determining whether a par ty
a rr an ged for th e disp osal of a h aza rd ous s ubs ta nce; however , it
is cumbersom e, e sp ecia lly  wh en  more t h a n  one  t ransact ion  i s
involved. The  nin e factor s conside red  can  be consolida ted  in t o
the followin g t h ree  cr it ica l fa ctors: (1 ) wh et her  the t r ansa ct ion
involved the sa le of a  use fu l produ ct ,105 (2 ) whethe r  t he  pa r ty
gene ra t ed th e ha zard ous subs ta nce,106 and (3) whether  the
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cour t : (2) who owned  th e ha zar dous  sub sta nce a t t he t ime of disp osal, (7) whe the r  t he
subst ance was a pr incipal business  product or a by-product, and (9) whether a  used
product  is be ing  sold for the sam e us e for wh ich it w as m an ufact ur ed. See supra
notes  100-04 an d accompa nyin g text .
107. This  addresses  the following factors considered by th e Am erican Cyanam id
cour t : (1) wh et he r t he  pa rt y h ad  kn owled ge of a nd  cont rol  over th e disposal, (2) who
owned th e ha zar dous s ubst an ce at t he t ime of disposa l, and  (3) the pa rt y’s in ten t. S ee
supra  note s 100-04 an d accompa nyin g text .
108. S ee supra  note s 19-21 an d accompa nyin g text .
109. S ee, e.g., Ek otek  Site  PRP  Comm . v. Self, 932 F . Sup p. 1328, 13 36 (D. Ut ah
1996) (referring to the u seful product  doctrine as “a fixture of CERCLA
ju ri sp ru de nce ”).
110. Id .
par ty actua l ly  pa r t i cipa ted in  ar r angin g for t he d isposa l or
tr eat men t  of the  hazardous  subs tance .107 Adop t ing th is  t es t
would  not  only m a k e  t he court ’s a na lysis m ore m an agea ble, it
would  also give gu idance on  wh at  type of a ct ivi t ies  wil l subject
a p er son t o liabilit y.
When  a  cour t  has  numerous  factors  to ana lyze,  it  i s d iffi cu l t
t o pr edict h ow mu ch em ph as is will be p ut  on an y pa rt icular
factor . With  on ly th ree factor s  t o conside r , it  wil l be  much
easier  for  a  cour t  to  make liability determinations, and the
liabilit y det erm ina tion s will be more u niform. It will also be
easier  for pa rt ies to predict h ow liability deter mina tions will be
resolved. This  would r edu ce th e am oun t of ar ra nger  liabilit y
lit iga t ion .108 An exp la na t ion  of ea ch  factor  follows.
A. The Usefu l Product  Doctrine
1. Reason for the useful product doctrine
 The us eful pr oduct  doctr ine is  well recognized by cour t s
even though it is not expresse d i n  t h e sta tu te. 109 The usefu l
p roduct  de fen se  “imp lici t ly r ecogn ize s t ha t  not  a ll  t ransact ions
impose ar ra nge r lia bilit y.”110 Cour t s  have  reasoned tha t  it i s
necess a ry t o conside r  the u se fu l produ ct  doct r in e beca use
t h e sa le of a  pr odu ct w h ich  con ta in s a  h a za rd ou s s u bs ta n ce
ca n n ot  be  equ a t e d  t o th e d isp osa l of th e su bst an ce it se lf or
even  the  m ak ing  o f  a r r an gemen t s  for  i t s  subsequen t
dis pos al  . . . .
These  dis tin ctio n s a re  n ece ss a ry  be ca u se  o t h e r w is e  t h e
s a le  of a n  a u tom obile  wou ld b e t h e d isp osa l of a h az ar dou s
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111. G. J . Le as in g Co.  v. U ni on  El ec. C o., 5 4 F .3d  379 , 38 4 (7t h C ir . 19 95).
112. Un it ed St at es  v. Ve rt ac C he m.  Cor p.,  966  F.  Su pp . 14 91,  150 8 (E .D.  Ark .
199 7); see also Ek otek  Site  PRP  Comm . v. Self, 881 F . Sup p. 1516, 15 27 (D. Ut ah
1995) (“So lon g as  th e de fen da nt s a re  sh own  to h ave  ar ra ng ed for  th e di spos al of
waste,  t he  cha ract e r iza t ion  of  the  t r ansf er  a s  a  ‘sa le’ will n ot p rov ide  pr ote ction  from
l iab il it y un de r C ER CLA. ”).
113. S ee G. J. Leasin g, 54  F. 3d  at  384  (“I n  the middle would be a mixed-motives
case, where t he seller’s goal was both to get r id of wastes an d to make a bona fide
sale  of com mer cia ll y v a lu abl e p rop er ty. ”). Companies selling their toxic wastes to
fertilizer companies may h ave mixed motives. It  is possible that t he companies are
as in te re st ed i n r ecei vin g m one y for  th eir  tox ic by-p rod uct s a s t hey are m otivated by
a  desire to dispose of their toxic wastes.
114. Er ic Fjelstad, 1992 Nin th Circuit  En viron m enta l Rev iew, J one s-H am ilt on  and
C E R CL A Arranged-For-Disposal Liabili ty, 23 E NVTL . L. 1107, 111 7-18  (199 3).
115. No. 92-C V-074 8, 1 997  U. S. D ist . LE XIS  191 92 (N .D. N. Y. No v. 1 4, 1 997 ).
116. S ee id . at *38.
117. S ee id .
118. Id . at *40.
su b st a n ce , sin ce a n  au tom obile  cont ai n s a  ba tt er y, a n d a
ba tt er y con ta in s le ad , wh ich  is a  h az ar dou s s u bst an ce . . . .
Those  wou ld  be  p repos t e rous  r e su l t s .111
2. Ch ar act eri za ti on  of the even t
 Consisten t  with  the reasonin g in Am erican  Cyanam id ,
cou r t s mus t  look  beyond the cha ra cterizat ion of th e event.
Mer ely cha racter izin g a  t r ansa ct ion  as a  sa le of a  use ful
p roduct  does n ot  pr eclu de  a  fin ding of lia bil it y. “If t he
t r ansact ion  is  rea lly  a  sh am for  disp osa l [of a  haza rdou s
subst an ce], CER CLA liabilit y will a tt ach .”112 However , t he re
may be more  than  one  w a y t o character ize  the even t . F or
exam ple, in  a “mixed motives” case, a pa rt y may be a s
inter ested  in getting rid of a subst an ce no longer  us eful t o him
as he is in  e a r n in g r evenue from the  sa l e of t ha t  subs t ance  to a
pa r ty tha t  has  a  u se for  i t.113 “As t h e sa le  of was tes  and
byp r odu ct s  be com e s  i n dist ingu ish able  from ord ina r y
commer cial t r ansa ct ion s,  the in ten t  of the ve ndor  may be com e
more sign ificant .”114 For  example , in  Cooper Ind us tries, In c. v.
Agwa y, In c.,115  t he defendan t’s ma nu factur ing process resu lted
in  scrap steel, which the defendant sold.116 Some of the
defendan t ’s scrap s teel  ended up  a t th e Rosen Super fund sit e.117
The cour t  looked past  t he  de fendan t ’s  cha ract e r iza tion  as  a s ale
and found  tha t  the defendan t ’s “purpose  for  en ter ing in to th i s
a r r angemen t  was to [permanent ly] r emove the  scrap  st eel from
its  pr oper ty.”118
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119. S ee, e.g.,  United  Sta tes  v.  Amer ican  Cyanami d Co. , Civ. No. 2:93-0654, 1997
U.S. Dis t.  LE XIS  441 3, a t *1 5 (S .D.  W. Va . J an . 27 , 19 97).
120. Ekotek  Site PRP Comm . v. Self, 932 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (D. Utah  1996)
(emph asis  added) (citing Ekotek Sit e PRP Co m m. v. Self, 881 F. Supp. 1516, 1527 (D.
Utah  199 5)).
121. 966 F.  Su pp . 14 91 (E .D.  Ark . 19 97).
122. Id . at 1507 (emphasis added) (quoting Douglas C ou n t y  v. Gould, Inc., 871
F . Su pp . 12 42,  124 5 (D.  Ne b. 1 994 )).
123. O’Neil  v. P icill o, 88 3 F .2d  176 , 17 9 n .4 (1 st  Cir . 19 89).
124. United  Sta tes  v. Gordon  Sta fford, Inc., 952  F. Su pp. 337, 3 39 (N.D. W. Va.
1997) (citing Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893  F.2 d 1313, 1317
(11th Cir . 199 0)); see also Un ited S ta tes v.  USX Corp., 68 F.3d  811, 822 (3d Cir.
1995) (“CERC LA . . . is  to b e con st ru ed l iber all y to e ffectu at e its  goals.”); B. F.
Goodr ich  Co. v. Murth a, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992) (“CERCLA must  be
cons t rued lib er al ly . .  . .”).
125. Un ited Stat es v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572, 577 (6th Cir. 1997),
va cat ed  an d r em an ded  on ot her  grou nd s su b n om . United St ates  v. Bestfoods, 118 S.
C t . 1876 (1998). “[I]t is difficult to divine the  specific, as opposed t o the  gener al, goals
of Congr ess w ith  res pect t o CERCLA lia bility.” Id. at 578.
3. S tand ards applied
 Even  th ough cour ts h ave generally recognized the usefu l
p roduct  doctr ine,119 court s  a r e  not  un it ed in the  st anda rd
requ ired  to su cces sfu lly  ass er t  the d efense . F or  exam ple,  the
cour t  in Ekotek S ite PRP Com m ittee v. Self noted  “tha t  the
usefu l p roduct s  defense  focuses only u pon  wh et her  the p rodu ct
is st ill fit for  it s or igi nal  pu rp ose.”120 In  compar ison , t he  cour t  in
United States v. Vertac Chem ical Corp .,121 d id  not  r equ i re tha t
the product be fit  for its original purpose a s long as it in volved
“[t]h e sa le of a  use fu l, a lt hough  haza rdou s su bst an ce, to ser ve a
particular purpose.”122 Differences such as th ese are significan t
s ince the  same t ransact ion  cou ld resu lt  i n  a  fi nding of l iab il it y
by one  cour t  and  no l iab ility by a not her  court . This  is
unaccep ta ble since “Congress intended for the federal court s to
de velop  a  un ifor m app roach” to l ia bi lit y u nde r  CE RCLA. 123
Many courts h ave reasoned that th ey “are required to
en gage  in a  libera l judicial in ter pr eta tion  of the t erm s wit hin
CERCLA in or der  to a chieve CE RCLA’s ‘overwh elmin gly
remedia l ’ st at ut ory sch em e.”124 “Accordin gly, cour ts  gener ally
will not  int er pr et  [CERCL A] in a w ay t h a t  appa ren tly
frus t r a t es t he  st a tu t e ’s  goa l s i n t he absen ce of specific
congr es siona l i nt en t  t o t he  con t ra r y. ”125 Noneth eless, liberal
cons t ruct ion  “may not be employed ‘as a  mea ns  for filling in t he
blanks so as  to d isce rn  a congres sional int ent  to im pose lia bility
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126. U S X Corp., 68 F .3d a t 8 22 (qu otin g Un ite d St at es v . Cor dova Chem . Co.,
59 F. 3d  584 , 58 8 (6t h C ir . 19 95)).
127. S ee Ekotek  Site PRP  Comm. v. Self, 948 F. Supp. 994, 997 (D. Uta h 1996)
(drawing an inference that  the defendant in tended to dispos e  of  h a zardous su bstan ces
from  the low price at which the pr o du c t  was sold); Chatha m St eel Corp. v. Brown,
858 F.  Su pp . 11 30,  114 0 (N .D.  Fl a.  199 4) (n ot ing tha t th e price paid for used
batter ies wa s d et er mi ne d b y t he  scr ap  pr ice of l ea d in  th e ba tt er ies ).
128. S ee Ch at ha m  S teel ,  858 F. Supp. at 1140 (reason i n g t h a t  a  tr an sact ion is
less likely to be deemed an ar ran gement t o dispose o f a  h a z a r dous  subs t ance  if  the
p roduct  re ta in s s om e va lu e for  th e p ur pos e it  wa s m an ufa ctu re d).
129. Duff Wilson, Fear  in  the F ieldsSHow Hazard ous Wastes B e com e
Fert ili zerSSp reading Hea vy M etal s on  Farm land is Perfectly Legal, Bu t L itt le R esear ch
Has Been Done to Find Out W hether It’s Safe, SEATTLE  TI M E S, J ul y 3,  199 7, a t A1 .
130. Id .
un der  nea rly e ver y conceivable  scen ar io.’”126 In terp re t ing
CERCLA in the sam e ma nn er a s th e Vertac Chemical cour t
would  be  the bet t er  app roach  for  a  cour t  to follow. Th e approach
ta ken  in Vertac Chemical is consiste n t  w ith  the s t a tu tory
language and does not discoura ge re cycling pr oduct s a s long a s
th e product h as a  par ticular  useful pu rpose.
There ar e m an y facts  a cour t m ay consider wh en
dete rmin ing whether th e tran saction at issu e was for t he s ale
of a  u sefu l  p roduct ,  r a the r  t h a n a  sham for  d isposa l.  For
examp le, one t ype of concr ete  eviden ce a cour t m ay consid er is
the p r ice  a t  which t he pr oduct was sold. If th e subst an ce was
sold a t  a p rice m uch  lower t ha n t he m ar ket  pr ice for a  us eab le
p roduct , an inference could be drawn tha t th e party intended to
dispose of a  hazardous  subs tance , not  a  useful p roduct .127 If a
p roduct  does not ha ve value for the pu rpose it wa s ma de (even
though it may have a residua l value t o th e bu yer) a nd  it
con ta ins a h aza rd ous s ubs ta nce, it  is likely t he t ra ns act ion  will
be  de em ed  to be  an  a r rangem en t  for  disp osal. 128 For exam ple, it
has been report ed in th e news th at  “[s]ome ind ust ries  disp ose  of
t ons of toxic wast e by giving it free to fertilizer m an ufactu rer s,
or  even  pa yin g t hem to t ake i t .”129 The  was tes , “lad en w ith
he avy met als” are t hen  used  as  a  raw ma ter ial for fert ilizer and
r oa d de-icer. 130 An inference can be drawn t hat  the indust r i es
a re a r rang ing for  the d ispos a l of t heir  wa st es  since they a re  not
pa id for th eir w as tes . However , even if t he in du st ries  wer e pa id
a  nomina l amount  for th eir  wa st es, a n  inference could be drawn
tha t  t h e t r ansa ct ion  did n ot  in volve  a  use ful produ ct  if t he
fert ilizer compa nies  wou ld  not  se ek  a  rep la cem en t  pr odu ct  if
th e indu str ies’ wast es were u na vailable.
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 3\ F I N A L \ R E G - F IN . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
1264 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1998
131. S ee, e.g., E kot ek , 94 8 F . Su pp . a t 9 96 n .1 (r e a s on i n g t ha t  t he  de fendan t
“carr ies th e bu rde n of proof as  to [th e us eful pr oduct ] defens e”). 
132. United  Sta tes  v. Amer ican C yan am id Co., Civ. No. 2:93-0654, 1997 U.S.
Dis t . LE XIS  441 3 (S .D.  W. Va . J an . 27 , 19 97).
133. Ekotek , 948 F .  Supp .  a t  967  (quot ing Ekotek Sit e PRP Com m. v. Self, 932
F . Sup p. 1328, 13 34-35 (D. Ut ah  1996)). 
134. S ee infra  note s 145-46 an d accompa nyin g text .
135. S ee Fjels ta d, supra  note 114, at 1118 (“In the spirit  of environmentalism,
part ies shou ld be en coura ged to r ecycle and s ell th eir byprodu cts wh en doin g so is
a  safe alter nat ive to land disposal or t reat men t.”). Although recycling should be
encouraged, “th e t hr ea t of lia bilit y for  well-inten tion ed r ecycling effort s is a  rea l one.”
Lee A. Bra em, Beating th e Recyclin g  Co n u n drum , 12 E NVTL . CO M P L IA N CE  & LITIG .
STRATEGY 4, 4  (199 7).
4. S h if ti ng h ow th e usefu l p rod uct d octr in e is  used
 Al though  cour t s  have re cognized the  use fu l  product  doct r ine
as an  affirmat ive defense,131 i ncorpora t ing i t  i n to a  mult i factor
ana lysis sh ift s  the way the d octr ine is us ed. For exam ple,
instead of tr eat ing it mer ely as a defens e, the Am erican
Cyanam id 132 court  used the  use fu l  p roduct  doct r ine  to
dete rmine whether  a  pr ima  fa cie cas e of ar ra nge r lia bilit y ha d
been met. This shifts t he bu rden  of p roof from the  de fendan t  t o
the pla in tiff. The plain tiff, as pa rt  of th e prim a facie case,
would  be required to show tha t ,  by  the t r ansact ion ,  the
defendan t  inten ded to disp ose of a ha zar dous  su bst an ce. This  is
a  sign ifica n t  sh ift  in  the bu rde n  placed  on t he p la in t iff,
poten tia lly making it  more  di ffi cu l t  for  a  p la in t iff to b r ing  an
act ion  un der CE RCLA. H owever , t h is  sh ift in g of t he burde n  of
p roof “is not onerous,”133 would  as sist  inn ocent  defen da nt s, a nd
may encour age r ecycling. Unle ss a  pla int iff could es t ablish a
p r ima facie case, the defendant  cou ld make  a  mot ion  for
summary judgmen t or  a m otion t o dism iss. Th is could
sign ificant ly lower the costs involved in defending against a
CERCLA su it  and t hus p er son s m ay be  les s con cer ned  abou t
incur r ing CER CLA liabilit y by re cycling. 134 Recycling helps the
environment  and should be encoura ged.135
B. Gen era tor s of  Haz ar dous S ubs ta nces
 The second  factor  th at  war ra nt s consider at ion by the  cour t s
is whether  the de fen da nt  gen er a ted  the h aza rdou s subst an ce or
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136. Lan sford-Coalda le Joint  Water  Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d  1209, 1221 (3d
Cir . 1993) (quoting J ohn S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Ga s Co., 992 F.2d 4 01, 408 (1st Cir .
199 3)).
137. S. RE P . NO . 96-848, at 15 (1980). The legislat ive history of CERCLA
indicates  that t he st atute’s  goals inclu de en sur ing t ha t t he bu rden  of remed ying
haza rdous waste  problems is bor n e by t hos e r esp ons ible  for cr ea tin g th e h aza rd ous
substa nces an d th at  th e social cost of uns afe disposa l pra ctices is int ern alized by t he
indust ries  th at  gene ra te t he w ast e. See id.  at 12-15, 31-34.
138. United  Stat es v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572, 578 (6th Cir. 1997),
va cat ed  an d r em an ded  on ot her  grou nd s sub n om.  United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S.
C t . 187 6 (19 98).
139. 932 F.  Su pp . 13 28 (D . U ta h 1 996 ).
140. Reply Mem. of Fuel Processors at 9, Ekotek Site PRP Comm . v. Self, 932
F . Su pp . 13 28 (D . U ta h 1 996 ) (No.  94-C V-002 77L ).
141. S ee id . at 11-12.
142. S ee Ekotek , 932 F. Supp. at  1334.
143. S ee id . at 1334-35.
mer ely enga ged in  a  t r ansact ion  involving the  hazardous
subst an ce. CERCLA’s essen tial pu rpose is to ma ke “ ‘those
res p on sible for  pr oble ms ca use d b y t he d ispos a l of ch em ica l
poi sons bea r t he cost s a nd  res pons ibility for r eme dying  the
harmfu l conditions they created.’”136 The need to focus on
gene ra tor s who “create the hazardous wastes” is addr essed in
the legisla tive  his tor y.137 Liabilit y should a tt ach only to “par ties
who a re  cu lpab le  in  the  sense th at  th ey, by some r ealis tic
me as ur e, he lped  to cre at e t he  ha rm ful condit ions.”138
There ar e significan t differe n ces  be tween  a r rangers  tha t
gene ra t e the ha zardous wa st es  they a re t ryin g t o get  r id  of an d
those a r r angers tha t do not. Recyclers, for example, usually do
not  cr ea t e haza rdous subst an ces. Instea d, th ey provide an
environm ent al  ben efit by findin g a u se for wh at  would
ot h erwise be  wa st e. An  exa mple of a n  a r ranger  tha t  did n ot
gene ra t e hazardous  was te  can  be found  in  Ek otek S ite PRP
Com m it tee v. S elf.139 Fuel Processors, one of the defendant s,
was “in t he  bus ine ss of tr ea tin g, recycling,  and r erefining us ed
oils.”140 Fu el Pr ocessors d id n ot gen era te u sed oil; ins tea d, it
obtained  wast e oil products  from gener a tors  and  tu rned  the
waste oil into a u seful product for differen t compan ies.141 The
fact s pr es en ted  by F uel P rocessor s  ind ica t ed tha t  Ekotek
app roached  Fuel Processors in  1986 and  requ ested  a clean
us able  oil p rodu ct  to manufact u r e au tom at ic tr an sm ission
fluid.142 Fu el Processors filtered u sed m iner a l oil  and  made  it  a
valu able  subs t ance  pr ior  to selling it to Ekotek .143 The cour t
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144. Id . at  1335. 
145. S ee Unit ed Sta tes v. Cello-Foil Prods., Inc., 100 F.3d 1227, 1234  n .6 (6th
C ir . 1996) (noting t ha t sin ce agre emen ts t o reu se an d recycle ba rr els ar e bene ficial,
t he court ’s decision s hould  not be  int erpr eted  in a  way that  discou ra ges  re us e or
re cyclin g); 141 CO N G. RE C . S4492, S4506  (1995) (“[M]an y ma te r ia l s wh ich  can  be
proper ly recycled are now not bein g captur ed for reuse becau se of Superfund liabi lit y
exp osu re .”). But see Uni ted S ta tes  v.  Mary land Sa nd , Gr av el &  St on e Co ., N o. H AR
89-2869, 1994  WL 54 1069 , at  *8 n.26 (D. Md. Aug. 12, 1994) (reasoning tha t ar ran ger
l iab il it y is n ot a  dis in cen ti ve t o r ecycl in g).
146. S ee, e.g., Un ite d St at es v . Mia mi  Dr um  Ser v., N o. 85-00 38-Ci v-Aron ovit z ,
1986 U.S. Dis t. L EXIS 16501, at  *10 n.4 (S.D. Fla . Dec. 12, 1986) (listing en coura ging
efficient re sou rce  al loca ti on  as  a g oal  of CE RCL A).
147. United  Stat es v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572, 578 (6t h C ir . 19 97),
va cat ed  a n d rem an ded  on ot her  grou nd s su b n om . United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S.
C t . 1876  (1998 ); see also Robins, supra  note 15, at  214 n.192 (“Th e le gisl at ive h ist ory
discusses t he n eed t o focus on gen era tor s wh o ‘crea te h aza rdou s wa ste s . . . an d . . .
de t ermine wh et he r a nd  how  to dispose of the se wa ste s.’”) (quotin g S. RE P . NO . 96-
848, at  15 (1980)). 
148. F o r example, indu str ies th at  give or pa y fertilizer  compan ies to t ake  th eir
haza rdous wastes away are generators.
149. S ee Chat ham  Steel Corp. v. Brown, 858 F. Su pp. 1130, 1142 (N.D. Fla. 1994)
(noting  that one of CERCLA’s goals  is  to place “responsibility for th e proper
t r ea tmen t  and d isposal of hazardous s ubsta nces on th ose who generate these
dange rous com pou nd s a nd  ar ra ng e for  th eir  dis pos al  or  tr ea tm en t”).
150. KEETON  ET AL ., supra  note 20, § 75, at 536.
151. S ee S t . P a u l F ire & Ma rine In s. Co. v. Warwick Dyeing Corp., 26 F.3d 1195,
1197-98 (1st Cir. 1994) (“[A] person that  generat es hazar dous substa nces and a rra nges
for  t heir disposal is strictly liable, rega rdles s of wheth er t he pe rson  was a t fau lt  or
wheth er  th e sub sta nce act ua lly cause d or cont ribu ted t o any d am age . . . .”); Quaker
S ta t e Minit -Lube, I nc. v. F irem an ’s Fu nd I ns. C o., 868 F. S upp. 1278 , 1332  (D. Utah
1995) (“S tr ict  lia bilit y is i mp osed  up on t hos e wh ose b us ine ss op era t ions  gene ra te
haza rdous waste, even  in  cas es  wh er e s uch  ‘re sp ons ible  pa rt ies ’ en tr us te d s uch
found tha t  the  record  ind ica ted the oil Fue l Pr ocessors s old to
Ek otek  could “be us ed a s h ydr au lic fluid, t ra ns forme r oil, a nd
fuel, appa r e ntly w ith out  fur th er  pr ocessin g.”144 If, by re cycling,
a  bu sines s p u t s i t se lf in  a  pos it ion  to be  lia ble  for  mult im ill ion
dollar  cleanup s, fewer busines ses will recycle.145 Th is  would be
con t ra ry t o the goa ls  of CE RCLA. 146
Generators, on  th e other  hand,  “crea te the  ha rmfu l
condit ions.”147 A genera tor  i s a  pa r ty tha t  p r oduces  a  usefu l
product , bu t  in  the p roces s of p rodu cin g t he u se fu l produ ct  a l so
gene ra t es ha zar dous  wa st e a s a  by-product of its operations.148
Genera tor s shou ld be re qu ire d t o pay t he ir own  wa y.149 Even  if
t h e gen er a tor  has “n ot  eve n  de pa r ted  in  any wa y fr om a
rea sona ble st an da rd  of inte nt  or car e,”150 t he  genera tor  shou ld
be liable for da ma ge done to th e envir onm ent  from it s
h a z a rdous wast e.151 “[A]s a  ma tt er  of public policy, . . .
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ma ter ials  t o a  co nt r a ct or  p r om is in g  t heir sa fe han dling, st orage, r ecycling or ult ima te
dis pos al .”).
152. Quaker State, 868 F. Supp. at  1332.
153. KEETON  ET AL ., supra  note 20, § 75, at 538.
154. Id . § 75, at 53 7. Although  Keeton  was n ot specifically refer rin g to
generators, hi s s ta te me nt  of the common law app lies to genera tors. If CERCLA was
intended  “to ab rog at e a  comm on-law principle, the stat ute [would have to] speak
direct ly to t he  qu est ion a ddr ess ed b y th e com mon law. ” Un i t ed  S ta t es  v . Best foods ,
118 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 (1998) (quoting with approval United Stat es v. T exas, 507 U.S.
529, 534  (199 3)).
155. Just  as in the u seful product doctrine, a court sh ould look beyond the
cha rac te r iza t ion of the even t. F or exam ple, a fer til izer  com pan y th at  mixes t oxic
substa nces int o its fert ilizer m ay t ry t o char acter ize it s  activit ies as  recycling.
However , instead of recycling the toxic substances into som ething tha t can be used,
a  court m ay find that it is only a method of disposing of an unwan ted h aza rd ou s
substa nce. For a  discuss ion of the be nefits  of recycling, see gener ally Robins , supra
no te 15.
gene ra tor s tr an sfer t heir  toxic bypr oduct s t o other s a t t heir  own
per il”1 5 2  a n d should be held liable if they create “an undue risk
of ha rm to othe r  members  of t he  community .”153 The gene ra tor
is  act in g for h is  own  pu rp ose s, a n d is  see kin g a  ben efit  or a
pr ofit  from  su ch  act ivitie s, a nd   . . . he is  i n  a  b et t e r  p os it i on  t o
adm in i s t e r  th e u n u su al  ris k b y p as sin g it  on  to t h e p u blic .  . . .
T h e pr oble m  is d ea lt  wi th  a s on e of a lloca t ing  a  more  o r  l e s s
ine vita ble  los s  t o be ch ar ged  ag ai n st  a com ple x a n d d an ger ou s
civiliza tion , an d lia bility  is  imposed  u p o n  t h e  p a r t y b e st  a b le  t o
shou lde r  i t .  The [gen era tor]  is  held l iable  m erely b e cause ,  a s  a
ma t t e r  o f socia l  ad jus tm en t ,  t he  conc lus ion  i s  t ha t  t h e
re spons ib i l it y  shou ld  be  so  p l aced .154
The cost of the  valu able produ ct t he gen era tor  sells s hou ld
refle ct  the cost of proper ly disposin g of its  hazardous  was te  and
of an y accide n tal discha rges. If the in creased costs m ak e th e
pr oduct  no longer  commer cially viable, t hen  th at  pr oduct  would
not  be pr oduced . Howeve r, eve n if r ecycling cann ot pay its own
wa y, recycling sh ould s till be e ncour aged  sin ce it ben efits
society by m in im izing wa st es  and con t r ibu t in g t o res ource
conse rva t ion .155 Du e t o such  policy considera t ions , the
mult i factor  an alysis reflects th e differen ce between t hose who
gen er a te h aza rdou s s ubs tances  and t hose  wh o do n ot .
C. Con tr ol or  Au th ori ty  to Contr ol t he Haz ar dous S ubs ta nce
 The th ird  factor  a  court  should consider  when  making a
liability deter mina tion is whet her  th e pa r ty sued  had con t rol of
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156. Care shou ld be taken when a nalyzing this issue. Discussions of this issue
in  cases  th at  do not  dea l with  ar ra nger  liabilit y ar e not  contr olling. S ee Gen er al  El ec.
Co. v. Aamco Transm issions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281, 287 (2d Cir. 1992) (“The fact ors
wh ich  ma ke a n owne r or oper at or a r espons ible par ty do not  apply wit h e qu al for ce
in  det er mi nin g ar ra ng er  lia bilit y.” (footn ote  omi tt ed)). Alt hou gh  not  cont rol ling, it  is
of int eres t t o note t ha t t he Su prem e Cour t r ecent ly held t ha t oper at or liabil ity only
att aches  if the person “man age[d], direct[ed], or conduct[ed] operations specifica lly
related  to pollut ion, t ha t is , oper at ions  ha vin g to d o wit h t he  lea ka ge or  dis posa l of
haza rdous wast e, or decisions  about  complian ce with  envir onm ent al r egula tion s.”
Best foods, 118 S. Ct. at 1887. The Best foods Cou rt  als o he ld t ha t a  pa re nt  corp ora tion
may be  held dire ctly lia ble u nd er  CE RCL A if it a ctu all y pa rt icipa te d in  th e wr ong
complained of. See id.  at  1886 . How eve r, t he  pa re nt  corp ora tion  is n ot l ia ble  for  t he
subs idiar y’s acts unless there is  an  indep ende nt  basis  for piercin g th e corpora te veil.
S ee id . at 1885-86.
157. S ee, e.g.,  supra n ote  156; see also Redwin g Car rier s, In c. v. Sar ala nd Apt s.,
94 F.3d 1489, 1500 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[C]ourts in CERCLA actions have ha d to
de termine wh en  to ‘pier ce t he  corp ora te veil’ to hold a corporat ion’s shar eholders
liable, wh et he r a  corp ora tion  can  be h eld  accou nt ab le a s a  ‘su ccess or’ corpor at ion for
i t s pr ede cess or’s CE RCL A lia bilit y, a nd  wh et he r a  dis solve d cor por at ion  is  subjec t  to
suit  un de r C ER CLA. ” (cita ti on s om it te d)).
158. S ee, e.g., U ni te d S ta te s v.  US X Cor p.,  68 F .3d  811 , 82 4 (3d  Cir . 19 95).
159. S ee, e.g., Kaiser  Aluminu m & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus  Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d
1338, 1341 (9th Cir . 1992) (reasoning that liability “only attaches if the defendant had
a u t h or i ty to  con t rol  the  cause  of  the con tamina t ion  a t  the t ime  the hazardou s
substa nces wer e r ele as ed i nt o th e en vir onm en t”); see gen erally Kamie  F r ischknech t
Brown , Note , Parent Corporation Liability for Subsidiary V iolation s U nd er § 107  of
CERCLA: Respon din g to U n i t ed St at es v. Cor dova Ch emica l Co., 1998 BYU L. R E V.
265.
the  hazardous  subs tance and ma de th e decision t o dispose of it.
Cour t s ha ve not develop ed a u niform st an dar d on whet her
ar ra nger  liability requir es act ua l pa rt icipat ion in  the a ct ivi ty or
w h eth er  the  au thor i ty to con t rol  the hazardous  subs tance is
su ffi ci en t .156 Th is  factor  i s mos t  often  discu ssed  whe n a  court  is
t ry ing to deter mine wh eth er t he corpora te veil should be
pierced to hold a corporat e officer or pa ren t corp ora tion  liable
un der  CE RCLA. 157 Cou r t s t ha t  have a dd res se d t he is su e of
whet her  CERC LA liabilit y sh ould extend  to corporat e officers or
paren t  corpora t ions  genera l ly ad op t  ei ther  (1 ) an  actua l
pa rt icipat ion  r equ i remen t ,158 or  (2 ) an  au thor i ty  to con t rol
r equ i remen t .159
1. Actual participation
  “[C]ases  concern in g t he li abil it y of corpora te officers and
employees as hazar dou s  w aste ‘generators’ or ‘arr angers’ of
ha z ardous was te d isposa l un der  [§ 9607(a)(3)] ha ve gene ra lly
requ ired  a ct u a l  pa r t i ci pa t i on  i n  th e liabilit y-creat ing
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160. U S X Corp., 68 F.3d a t 824 n .25. Court s ma y phr ase t his a s th e “crucial
decis ion” tes t. S ee, e.g., United Sta tes v. North La nding Line Co n st r . Co., 3 F.
Supp.2d  694, 701 (E .D. Va . 199 8) (“[T]he C our t fin ds t ha t t he  . . . ‘cruci al d ecis ion’
ap pr oach  should  be  applied . . . .”); United St ates  v. A & F Materia ls Co., 582 F.
Supp. 842, 845 (S .D. Ill. 1984) (reasoning tha t liability should rest “with th at par ty
wh o bot h  owned th e haza rdous wa ste a nd m ade th e crucial decision how it would be
disposed of or  tr ea te d, a nd  by w ho m”).
161. United  Stat es v. TIC Inv. Corp., 68 F.3d 1082, 1087-88 (8th Cir . 1995).  The
cour t  i n  TIC  Investment held tha t th e proper sta ndar d “imposes direct arr anger
l ia b il it y on  a corpor at e officer or  direct or if he or s he h ad t he a ut horit y to contr ol an d
did in  fact  exe rci se  act ua l or  su bst an ti al  cont rol , dir ect ly or indirectly, over the
a r r angemen t for  dis pos al , or  th e off-s it e d isp osa l, of h az a r d ou s sub sta nces.” Id . a t
1089.
162. S ee Fjel st ad, su pra note  114, at  1111 n.21  (“Clear ly, the  Eight h Cir cuit
believes tha t  t he  au thor ity  to control hazar dous substance disposal is critical and that
th is auth ority is assumed when a pa rty owns the subst ances  a t  is sue. ”) . However ,
the re ar e a lso cou rt s t ha t h ave  exp re ssl y r eject ed t he  au th orit y to control stan dard.
S ee, e.g., Genera l Elec. Co. v. Aamco Transm issions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281, 286  (2d  Ci r .
1992) (“[T]hi s cou rt  can no t co ncl ud e t ha t b y en act in g § 96 07(a )(3),  Congre ss inten ded
to hold an y ent ity th at  mer ely ha d th e opport un ity or a bility to cont rol a t hir d par ty’s
wastes  disposa l pra ctices liable a s an  ent ity th at  ‘othe rwise  ar ra nged for’ dispos al or
t r anspor t  of ha za rd ou s w as te .”).
163. TIC Inv. Corp., 68 F.3d at 1089.
conduct . ”160 Cour t s  t ha t  take  th is  approach  r eason  tha t  “a
findin g of ar r anger  lia bil it y r equ ir es  som e le vel  of actua l
pa rt icipat ion in or e xercise of contr ol over, a ctivit ies tha t  a r e
causa lly conne cted  to, or  h ave som e ne xus  wit h, t he
a r rangement for  d isposa l of hazardous subs t ances or  t he  off-s it e
disp osal it self.”161
2. Au thority to control
 T h er e ar e some cou r t s  t h a t  do n ot  req uir e a ct u a l
part icipat ion  as  long a s t he  per son h ad  th e a ut hor ity t o
contr ol.162 Th e r a t ion a le for  using t he a u thor it y t o cont rol
stan dard is because otherwise
[a ] corp or a te  officer , w h o has  v i r tu a l ly  un l imi t ed  con t r o l ove r  a
com p a n y a n d  i n  fact  exe rcise s t ha t con tr ol bu t k now s w ell
e n ou g h to  close  h is or  h er  ey es  to  th e s pe cific d et a ils  of t h e
com p a n y ’s  haza rdous  wa s te  d i sposa l  p rac t i ces , could  av oid
C E R C L A  l iab ili ty ; me an wh ile, th e em ploye e ch ar ged  wit h t he
job  o f ac tua l ly ca r ry ing  ou t  t h e  d i sposa l  ac t iv i t i e s  or  m ak in g
t h e d i sposa l  a r r an gemen t s—even  if h e  or  s h e h a s  n o
m e a n in g fu l de cision m a ki n g a u th or ity —cou l d  n ot  av oid
per sona l  l iabi l i ty .163
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164. Id .
165. United  Sta tes v.  Cello-Foil Prods., Inc., 100 F.3d 1227, 1233 (6th Cir. 1996)
(quotin g Wa sh in gt on  v. D av is,  426  U. S. 2 29,  253  (197 6) (S te ven s, J ., con cur ri ng )).
166. S ee Redwings Carriers, Inc. v. Sara land Apts., 94 F.3d 1489, 1506 n.23 (11th
Cir . 1996) (“It is possible that  under  differe n t  factu al circum sta nces, a  plain tiff could
p redica t e a cl ai m u nd er  su bs ect ion  107 (a)(3 ) on a  de fen da nt ’s fail ur e t o ac t. ”).
167. S ee, e.g., Jones-Ha milton Co. v. Beazer Mat erials & Ser vs., 973 F.2d 688,
695 (9th Cir. 1992); United St ates  v. Aceto Agric. Chem . Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1389
(8th  Cir . 19 89).
168. S ee, e.g.,  Genera l E lec. Co. v. Aamco Transm issions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281 (2d
Cir . 199 2).
169. The sam e ar gum ent s th at  were  ma de for na tiona l un iformity i n  supra  text
accompany ing notes 30-31 also apply to this issue.
170. United  St at es  v. U SX Cor p.,  68 F .3d  811 , 82 4 (3d  Cir . 19 95).
“From a  pol icy s t andp oin t , such  a  holding would v iola te the
goals  un der lying CE RCLA by crea t ing a  loophole for  power fu l
ind ividu als  . . . .”164
Sin ce it is pr esum ed th at  a per son “inten d[s] the na tu ra l
consequ ences of his de eds ,”165  some cour t s  have  reasoned tha t
in ten t  can be inferr ed whet her  th e person a ctua lly part icipat ed
in  a r ranging for  d isposa l or  chose  not  to t ake  par t  in  making
the ar ra ngem ent s for disp osal even  th ough h e could h ave.166
Some cour t s  have  r easoned tha t  au thor i ty  to contr ol ma y be
assumed  when  a  company owns  the hazardous  mater ia ls  a t  the
t ime of t he  a rr angemen t .167
Most  cour t s  have  r easoned tha t  au thor i ty to con t rol  is  not
enough; th ere m u s t  a lso be  an  obliga t ion  to exe rcise con t rol
before a r ranger liability att aches.168 Al though  there  may be
some policy reas ons for court s to adopt  one appr oach over
anothe r ,169
[a ]t  th e t im e CE RC LA w as  en act ed, it  wa s firm ly  e s t ab l i shed
t h a t  con t r o l o f a  co rpora t ion ,  in  an d  o f i t s e l f,  was  no t  a  ba s i s
for  im pos in g lia bilit y on  a c o r p or a t e  officer  for t h e a ction s of
ot h e r corp or a te  officer s or  em ploy ee s. I n st ea d, a ctu a l
pa r t i cipa t ion  in  the  wr ongfu l  conduc t  was  a  p re requ i s i t e .170
The act ua l pa rt icipat ion st an da rd  is consist ent  with  pr inciples
of corpor at e la w. Gen er ally,
[a ]n  o ff ice r of a cor por at ion  wh o ta ke s p ar t in  th e com m iss ion
of a  t o r t  by  th e  corpora t ion  i s  pe r sona l ly  l iab l e  for  r e su lt in g
in ju r i e s ; b u t  a n  offi ce r  w h o  t a k e s  n o p a r t  in  t h e  com m i ss ion  of
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171. 3A WI L L I AM  ME A D E  F L E T CH E R , F LETC H E R  CY CL O P E DI A O F  T H E  LAW OF
P RIVATE CORP O R A TI O N S § 1137 (James Solheim & Kenneth  Elkins eds., perm. ed.
1994) (foot no te s om it te d).
172. S ee Un ite d St at es v . Bes tfood s, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1885  (1998) (“[N]othin g in
CERCLA pur port s to r eject [th e] bedrock pr inciple [of limited lia bility], a nd against
th is venerable common-law backdrop, th e con gr ess iona l sil en ce is  au dibl e.”); U S X
Corp., 68 F.3d at 824 (“CERCLA’s langua ge fails to indicate th at t ra ditiona l concepts
of lim it ed  lia bil it y a re  to b e d isr ega rd ed  . . . . ”).
173. Midlan tic Nat ’l Bank v. Ne w Jer sey Dept. of Envtl. Pr otection, 474 U .S. 494,
501 (1986 ); see also Best foods, 118 S. Ct. at 1885.
174. United  States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572, 578 (6th C ir . 19 97),
va cat ed  an d r em an ded  on ot her  grou nd s su b n om . Un i t ed  S tates  v. Bestfoods, 118 S.
C t . 187 6 (19 98).
175. S ee, e.g., Ek otek  Site  PRP  Comm . v. Self, 932 F . Sup p. 1328, 13 36 (D. Ut ah
199 6).
th e t ort  is n ot p er son ally  liab le  to t h ird  pe rs on s for  th e t ort s of
oth er  ag en ts , officers , or e m ploy ee s of t h e cor por at ion .171
CE RCLA’s la ngu age d oes  not  in di ca t e  t ha t t r ad it i ona l concept s
of limited liability sh ould be disregarded.172 “The normal ru le of
s t a tu tory cons t ruct ion  is  t ha t  if Congress intends for  leg is la t ion
to change the  in te rpre ta t ion  of a  judicially crea ted  concept, it
ma kes  th at  int en t s pecific.”173 There fore , cou r ts sh ould only
consider  a  pa r ty t o be  a  res pon sible  pe r son  un der § 9607(a)(3) if
the pa r ty a ctua lly  pa r t icip a ted  in  a r rangin g for  the disposa l of
the ha zardous wastes.
VI. CO N C L U S I O N
The s ta tu tory  language  of “a r range for” implies th at  more is
requ ired  to im pos e liabil it y t han  just  pr ior  own er sh ip  of th e
subst an ce. “[W]hile the liability provisions .  .  . should be
cons t rued so tha t finan cial resp on sibi lit y for  clea n-up
opera t ions fa lls  upon  those  en t it ies  tha t  cont r ibu ted  to the
envir on m enta l problem, th e widest n et possible ought n ot be
cast in  order  to snare those  who a re  ei ther  i nnocen tly or
ta ngen tia lly t i ed  to the  faci li ty a t  i ssue.”1 7 4  To hold a person
resp onsible for  ar ra nge r lia bilit y, th e per son m us t h ave
intended to get rid of its hazardous wastes.175
The m os t  effect ive  met hod t o facili t a t e a  un ifor m app roach
to CER CLA ar ra nge r lia bilit y is  for  t he  cour t s  to adop t  the
s t a tu tory la ngu age p roposed in  th is Comm ent . However , un til
Congress clears u p  t h e am biguity in th e langu age us ed in 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3), adopting t he m an ageable m u l tifactored
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ana lysis a lso p roposed  in  this  Comment  wou ld he lp  cour t s
dete rmine whethe r  a pers on a rr an ged for dis posa l of its
hazardous wast es. It  would a lso help  pa rt ies de ter min e
beforeh an d which  type  of act ivities ma y resu lt in CE RCLA
liab ility.  Mos t  im por tan t ly,  it  wou ld  facili t a t e a  un ifor m
approach  by th e fed er a l cou r t s in de ter min ing a rr an ger lia bility
un der CE RCLA.
Ma raly n M iln e Reger
